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CAROLINE CECOT† 
ABSTRACT 
 
  Cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) has faced significant opposition 
during most of its tenure as an influential agency decisionmaking tool. 
As advancements have been made in CBA practice, especially in more 
complete monetization of relevant effects, CBA has been gaining 
acceptance as an essential part of reasoned agency decisionmaking. 
When carefully conducted, CBA promotes transparency and 
accountability, efficient and predictable policies, and targeted 
retrospective review. 
  This Article highlights an underappreciated additional effect of 
extensive use of CBA to support agency rulemaking: reasonable 
regulatory stability. In particular, a regulation based on a well-
supported CBA is more difficult to modify for at least two reasons. The 
first reason relates to judicial review. Courts take a “hard look” at 
agency findings of fact, which are summarized in a CBA, and they 
require justifications when an agency changes course in ways that 
contradict its previous factfinding. A prior CBA provides a powerful 
reference point; any updated CBA supporting a new course of action 
will naturally be compared against the prior CBA, and the agency will 
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need to explain any changes in CBA inputs, assumptions, and 
methodology. The second reason relates to the nature of CBA. By 
focusing on the incremental costs and benefits of a proposed change, 
CBA can make it difficult for an agency to justify changing course, 
especially when stakeholders have already relied on the prior policy. 
Together, these forces constrain the range of changes that agencies 
could rationally support. CBA thus promotes regulatory stability 
around transparent and increasingly efficient policies. 
  But, admittedly, this CBA-based stabilizing influence gives rise to 
several objections. This Article responds to, among others, concerns 
about democratic accountability and, most importantly, the use of 
alternative methods of policy modification. Overall, the Article 
concludes that CBA and judicial review of CBA play a desirable role 
in stabilizing regulatory policy across presidential administrations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In October 2015, President Barack Obama unveiled the long-
anticipated Clean Power Plan (“CPP”) issued by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”).1 The CPP would regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions from existing power plants pursuant to the Clean Air Act. 
The rule was supported by hundreds of pages of technical analysis of 
the CPP’s expected costs and benefits—an analysis referred to as a 
cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”).2 According to the CBA, the rule’s 
benefits to society would dwarf its costs. Society would be significantly 
better off under the CPP to the tune of $22.6 billion worth of net health 
and safety benefits each year in likely scenarios.3 
But elections have consequences—and President Donald Trump 
was elected in part based on his campaign promises to rescind, modify, 
and repeal many Obama-era regulations, especially energy and 
environmental regulations such as the CPP.4 In his first few months in 
office, President Trump issued several executive orders directing 
agencies to follow through on those promises.5 On the chopping block 
were several EPA regulations, including the Waters of the United 
 
 1. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R, pt. 60). 
 2. See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN POWER PLAN FINAL 
RULE, EPA-452/R-15-003 (Aug. 2015). Such an analysis is also referred to as a benefit-cost 
analysis, or BCA.  
 3. This number represents the midpoint of the mass-based 2025 annual net monetized 
benefits estimate included in the Rule’s Federal Register notice, using a 3 percent discount rate 
and reflecting 2016 dollars updated according to the Consumer Price Index. 
 4. See Press Release, Donald J. Trump, Donald Trump’s Contract with the American Voter 
(Oct. 22, 2016), https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/_landings/contract/O-TRU-102316-
Contractv02.pdf [https://perma.cc/98VH-BWGJ].  
 5. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017); Exec. Order No. 
13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Mar. 1, 
2017). 
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States Rule,6 the Methane 111(b) Rule,7 the Landfill Rule,8 the Steam 
Electric Effluent Limitation Guidelines Final Rule,9 and the Risk 
Management Plan Rule Amendments.10 According to their CBAs, 
these rules were expected to provide at least $350 million in net 
monetized benefits to society each year.11 
Making good on President Trump’s most famous repeal promise, 
EPA revealed its proposed repeal of the CPP in October 2017.12 It, too, 
was accompanied by a long CBA, one that summarized the expected 
costs and benefits of repealing the CPP.13 According to the new 
analysis, repealing the CPP would, most likely, not benefit society. In 
fact, society would lose out on billions of dollars’ worth of 
environmental and health benefits under most scenarios.14 Notably, 
 
 6. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 
(June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.). EPA has 
proposed repeal of this rule, see Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of 
Pre-Existing Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. 34,899 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
328 and scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.), and proposed a revised rule to take its place, see Revised 
Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4,154 (Feb. 14, 2019). 
 7. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified 
Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824 (June 3, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (currently stayed 
at 82 Fed. Reg. 25,730). 
 8. Emission Guidelines and Compliance Times for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 59,276 (Aug. 29, 2016); 81 Fed. Reg. 59,331 (Aug. 29, 2016) (currently stayed at 82 Fed. Reg. 
24,878). 
 9. Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating 
Point Source Category, 80 Fed. Reg. 67,838 (Nov. 3, 2015) (currently stayed). 
 10. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the 
Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 4,594 (Jan. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68). EPA has 
proposed repeal of this rule. See Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk 
Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 24,850 (May 30, 2018) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68). 
 11. The net-benefit estimates are calculated by taking the midpoint of the net-benefits range 
included in the Rule’s Federal Register notice, using a 3 percent discount rate where possible and 
reflecting 2016 dollars updated according to the Consumer Price Index. The numbers do not 
include unquantified benefits, which were often deemed “important” in the CBA notwithstanding 
the agency’s failure to quantify or monetize them. See, e.g., Accidental Release Prevention 
Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 4,594, 4,598 
(EPA Jan. 13, 2017) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68) (“However, the monetized impacts omit many 
important categories of accident impacts including lost productivity, the costs of emergency 
response, transaction costs, property value impacts in the surrounding community (that overlap 
with other benefit categories), and environmental impacts.”). 
 12. See Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Virginia; 
Amendment to Ambient Air Quality Standard for Ozone, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (Oct. 16, 2017) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). 
 13. See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE REVIEW OF THE CLEAN POWER 
PLAN: PROPOSAL, EPA-452/R-17-004 (Oct. 2017). 
 14. Id. at 13. 
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however, the estimated net losses of repeal were calculated to be 
significantly lower than the net benefits initially calculated by President 
Obama’s EPA. That is because President Trump’s EPA made some 
changes to the prior CBA’s assumptions and inputs. Already, this new 
CBA has been criticized in the press as exaggerating the costs and 
diminishing the benefits of the regulation.15 And, once finalized, the 
repeal of the CPP will likely be challenged in court as demonstrating 
EPA’s “arbitrary” or “capricious” decisionmaking.16 When that 
happens, courts will compare the Trump EPA’s CBA to the Obama 
EPA’s CBA. And, importantly, courts will require the Trump EPA to 
explain its changes. The difficulty of this task will depend in part on 
how well reasoned and complete the original, Obama-era CBA was. If 
the new CBA does not withstand challenges to its new scope, 
methodology, or assumptions, then it could undermine the agency’s 
entire reasoning for the new rule and lead to judicial vacatur. 
This example highlights a surprising obstacle to at least some of 
the Trump administration’s deregulatory agenda—CBA. Previously, 
CBA has been characterized as a deregulatory tool that slows down or 
blocks regulation.17 CBA has also been described as one of the means 
of presidential control of agency action.18 Both characterizations 
suggest that CBA could facilitate an administration’s deregulatory 
agenda. But, actually, CBA—which, at its best, reflects rational 
decisionmaking—does not fit neatly into either of these categories.  
Administrative law has developed certain rules ensuring that 
when agencies change course based on a new assessment of underlying 
 
 15. See, e.g., Karl Hausker, The Flawed Analysis Behind Trump Administration’s Proposed 
Repeal of the Clean Power Plan, WORLD RES. INST. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.wri.org/ 
blog/2017/10/flawed-analysis-behind-trump-administrations-proposed-repeal-clean-power-
plan [https://perma.cc/JM3M-63PQ]; Richard L. Revesz & Jack Lienke, The E.P.A.’s Smoke and 
Mirrors on Climate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
10/09/opinion/environmental-protection-obama-pruitt.html [https://perma.cc/4AK7-FLVG]. 
 16. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 17. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies 
and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 1003–04 (2015); see also Marc Granetz, Deregulation Rodeo: 
Reagan’s Rulebusters Get Ready to Ride, NEW REPUBLIC 9–12 (Nov. 12, 1984); David Hoffman, 
Election ’84: The Reagan Record, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1984, at A6. 
 18. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2277–86 
(2001); see generally Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative 
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) (discussing how 
procedural requirements can facilitate political control by Congress and the president); Eric A. 
Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001) (analyzing “cost-benefit analysis as a method by which the 
President, Congress, or the judiciary controls agency behavior”).  
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facts, they provide a reasonable explanation for the change.19 This 
requirement protects reliance interests and ensures good governance.20 
A CBA, in essence, provides a summary of the underlying facts that 
support an agency’s decision. In this context, the existence of CBAs 
supporting the original rules—which I refer to as “prior CBAs”—poses 
unique challenges for a new administration’s efforts to repeal, rescind, 
or modify rules. In particular, for each CBA-supported policy or rule 
that Trump-era agencies decide to repeal, rescind, or modify, they will 
need to produce new CBAs,21 and those CBAs will be scrutinized by 
courts for their reasonableness.22  
Although courts typically give deference to agency CBAs in the 
first instance,23 any new CBA will be judged against a prior CBA in the 
administrative record. This comparison will highlight the changes 
made by the agency in justifying the new rule, and each change requires 
explanation. Many Obama-era regulations that have been targeted for 
repeal by the Trump administration were supported by CBAs that 
demonstrated large net benefits to society overall. Trump-era agencies 
will have to ground their modifications in scientific evidence that 
supports different input values, in changed conditions that motivate 
different methodological assumptions, or in transparent disagreements 
on policy. Although some inputs that make up a high-quality CBA 
 
 19. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515–16 (2009); Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43–44 (1983). For a comprehensive 
discussion about administrative law rules that apply to deregulation and about the abuse of those 
rules under the Trump administration, see generally Robert L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond, 
The Administrative Law of Regulatory Slop and Strategy, 68 DUKE L.J. 1651 (2019); Bethany A. 
Davis Noll & Denise A. Grab, Deregulation: Process and Procedures that Govern Agency 
Decisionmaking in an Era of Rollbacks, 38 ENERGY L.J. 269 (2017). Of course, these 
administrative law constraints do not apply to Congress. In 2017, Congress used the Congressional 
Review Act to eliminate fourteen Obama-era rules, notwithstanding CBA.  See Dylan Scott, The 
New Republican Plan to Deregulation America, Explained, VOX (Apr. 25, 2018, 9:30am EDT), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/25/17275566/congressional-review-act-what-
regulations-has-trump-cut [https://perma.cc/38RK-EED3].  
 20. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 21. Under Executive Order No. 12,866, executive agencies are required to conduct CBA for 
significant regulations. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994). If a regulation required 
CBA, then its repeal will generally also require CBA. 
 22. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 23. See Caroline Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-Cost Analysis, 
22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 575, 592–605 (2015). For one account of how judicial review of agency 
procedures can improve decisionmaking, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in 
Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1761–62 (2007).  See Dylan Scott, The New 
Republican Plan to Deregulation America, Explained, VOX (Apr. 25, 2018, 9:30am EDT), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/25/17275566/congressional-review-act-what-
regulations-has-trump-cut [https://perma.cc/38RK-EED3]. 
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might be subject to reasonable disagreement, there are many inputs 
that would be difficult to alter, given current scientific consensus. In 
the CPP, for example, the Trump EPA might be able to lower the value 
of carbon-emission reductions—an input referred to as the “social cost 
of carbon”—so that the number reflects only the benefits of reducing 
carbon emissions in the United States.24 The Trump EPA cannot, 
however, estimate the value at zero.25 In this way, a well-supported, 
high-quality CBA—a conduit for presidential oversight and control 
once thought to be simply a hindrance to issuing regulations—becomes 
an obstacle to repealing regulations by presidential fiat. 
This Article highlights an underappreciated additional effect of 
extensive use of CBA to support agency rulemaking: reasonable 
regulatory stability.26 Scholars have argued that agency procedures, 
especially when reviewed by courts, have significant costs—for 
example, they can constrain responsiveness and delay action—that 
might outweigh any benefits those procedures have in improving 
decisionmaking.27 Simply put, the argument is that the potential for 
 
 24. See, e.g., Ted Gayer & W. Kip Viscusi, Determining the Proper Scope of Climate Change 
Policy Benefits in U.S. Regulatory Analyses: Domestic versus Global Approaches, 10 REV. ENVTL. 
ECON. & POL’Y 1, 1–19 (2016); Peter Howard & Jason Schwartz, Think Global: International 
Reciprocity as Justification for a Global Social Cost of Carbon, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 203, 203–
95 (2017); Arden Rowell, Foreign Impacts and Climate Change, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371, 
371–421 (2015). 
 25. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) cannot value 
carbon-emission reductions at zero without explaining its reasoning); Endangerment and Cause 
or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 66,496, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I) (“The Administrator finds that 
six greenhouse gases taken in combination endanger both the public health and the public welfare 
of current and future generations.”). 
 26. Recently, Aaron L. Nielson made a similar argument about the unsung benefits of 
ossification, though without focusing on the role of CBA in particular. See Aaron L. Nielson, 
Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 90–93 (2018). For other related literature, see Nina A. 
Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New President 
Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 616–60 (2003) (arguing that there are benefits to agency 
“entrenchment” or “burrowing” actions before a new administration, such as “midnight” 
rulemaking and late-term hiring); Stuart Shapiro, Embracing Ossification, 41 REG. 8, 10 (2018-
2019) (arguing that views about the benefits of ossification depend on whether one’s regulatory 
preferences align with the administration’s preferences); William W. Buzbee, The Tethered 
President: Consistency and Contingency in Administrative Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1390–1412 
(2018) (describing how various doctrines in administrative law promote regulatory stability).  
 27. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. 
L. REV. 87, 128 (2001) (agreeing that detailed judicial scrutiny of agency rationales has 
contributed to “ossification” of the regulatory process); William S. Jordan, III, Ossification 
Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to 
Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 394–95 (2000); 
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CBA to constrain agency action is itself a cost of CBA. And that is 
undoubtedly true. But this potential to constrain is also a benefit of 
CBA. In fact, the benefits of CBA-based constraints are likely to 
outweigh their costs.  
Unconstrained agency responsiveness could be beneficial, but it 
could also be hasty, unpredictable, or unstable. CBA does constrain 
some agency action and reduce responsiveness, but the procedure is 
likely to strike the right balance by ensuring that any CBA-induced 
stabilization takes hold around efficient policies. Reliance on CBA 
does not generally freeze regulatory policy because “net-beneficial” 
changes could always be made. Further, the idea of net-beneficial 
action is a dynamic concept, and what supports such action evolves 
based on the available evidence. But a world in which agency 
decisionmaking is driven by CBA is necessarily a world in which 
potential shifts away from current regulatory policy are more limited, 
especially when the existing policy was justified by a high-quality CBA. 
A commitment to CBA, then, promotes the development of regulatory 
policy in predictable and science-based ways. This focused and 
discriminating stickiness—as opposed to stickiness around arbitrary or 
unpredictable policies—is likely to be more desirable than 
unconstrained agency action. Although an agency that is untethered by 
CBA can be more responsive, its actions are less likely to be efficient, 
generating significant costs of over- and underregulation. This Article 
argues that a commitment to agency CBA promotes beneficial 
ossification around reasonable rulemaking.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I defines CBA and traces its 
increasing importance in agency rulemakings. CBA is a 
decisionmaking tool that allows regulators to identify welfare-
maximizing policies by considering the expected costs and benefits of 
implementing the policies and converting those effects into dollar 
values.28 Agencies increasingly rely on CBA to support rulemakings, 
propelled by their obligations under the Administrative Procedure Act 
 
Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor 
Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 529–30 (1997); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on 
“Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387 (1992) (noting that “it is difficult 
to disagree with the conclusion that it is much harder for an agency to promulgate a rule now than 
it was twenty years ago”). 
 28. For a detailed description of CBA and its philosophical origins as a decision procedure, 
see MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
1 (2006).  
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(“APA”) to act rationally,29 their statutory directives to analyze costs 
and benefits,30 and applicable executive orders dating back to President 
Ronald Reagan that require agencies to choose welfare-maximizing 
regulatory options.31 When carefully conducted, CBA promotes 
transparency and accountability, efficient and predictable policies, and 
targeted retrospective review. 
Parts II and III form the heart of the Article, describing and 
applying the constraints that flow from a commitment to CBA-based 
policymaking. Part II dives into the special role CBA plays when an 
agency changes course. Simply put, the original CBA wields significant 
influence. First, judicial review of agency CBA constrains the changes 
that are available to that agency. Although courts are generally 
deferential when first encountering a CBA, courts are likely to subject 
an updated CBA to more scrutiny—not because they are legally 
obligated to review a new CBA more thoroughly, but because the prior 
CBA acts as an important reference point from which the agency must 
explain any changes. The prior CBA, after all, provides a succinct 
summary of the underlying facts that the agency previously found 
compelling. Second, CBA norms constrain future changes. By design, 
CBA highlights the incremental costs and benefits of changing 
regulatory stringency. The baseline—or the status quo—is the world 
under the original policy. The costs and benefits of, say, repealing that 
original policy are different than the costs and benefits of never issuing 
that policy in the first place. And, fundamentally, reliance on CBA 
means that a proposed policy must have a basis in scientific or other 
evidence that justifies the policy. Rules with CBAs that have become 
obsolete—whether due to different estimates of health, safety, or 
environmental risks and their value or due to different costs associated 
with mitigating those risks—are ripe for CBA-based updating. But 
more recent CBA-based rules are more difficult to alter in any 
dramatic, and still cost-benefit-justified, way because the available 
evidence is unlikely to have changed significantly. This effect 
 
 29. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 30. See, e.g., Section 1412 of the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g–1(b)(3)(C)(i) 
(2012) (requiring EPA to calculate the “incremental costs and benefits associated with each 
alternative maximum contaminant level considered” and consider these costs and benefits when 
establishing a maximum contaminant level); Section 112(n)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring a comparison of costs and benefits according to the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation, see Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015)). 
 31. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011); Exec. Order No. 
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 
1981). 
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constrains the timing of policy swings, making it less likely that 
regulations will swing wildly from one administration to another. Part 
III, then, describes how CBA-based constraints could apply to 
deregulatory actions under the Trump administration.  
Part IV responds to several challenges to the desirability of a 
CBA-based stabilizing role. These critiques include concerns that CBA 
constraints exacerbate agency bias toward rulemaking, limit agency 
flexibility, make elections meaningless, reduce accountability, and 
promote deregulation by other means. Most importantly, this Article 
addresses whether, in light of CBA-based constraints, an agency might 
pursue its goals—regulatory or deregulatory—by avoiding CBA-based 
justifications altogether. That is, instead of arguing that its new policy 
reflects better standards or decisionmaking, an agency might shift to 
arguing about statutory authority—namely, that the arguably “better” 
policy, as viewed from a CBA perspective, is not authorized by 
Congress. Case in point: EPA is justifying its proposed repeal of the 
CPP by arguing that, under its new interpretation of a provision of the 
Clean Air Act, the CPP as originally proposed exceeds EPA’s statutory 
authority.32 And such arguments have not been limited to the CPP.33 
Arguably, instability regarding statutory interpretation is worse than 
instability regarding regulatory stringency. But CBA culture is not to 
blame for interpretive instability. Moreover, CBA can play a role in 
mitigating such instability. Courts give deference to agencies’ 
interpretations of their own authority, but it is not clear that such 
deference should extend to agency interpretations that limit their 
ability to promulgate welfare-enhancing policies that would be 
allowable under other statutory interpretations. Overall, this Article 
argues that CBA’s stabilizing role withstands these criticisms and, 
further, that it is likely to reduce concerns about agency bias and 
enhance accountability through transparency. 
 
 32. See Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Virginia; 
Amendment to Ambient Air Quality Standard for Ozone, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,036 (Oct. 16, 
2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). 
 33. See, e.g., Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing 
Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. 34,899 (July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts 
of 40 C.F.R.). 
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I.  AGENCY COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS  
A. Practice 
Since 1981, when President Reagan issued Executive Order 
12,291,34 all federal executive agencies have conducted CBA, making it 
a staple of important U.S. regulatory policy developments. Pursuant to 
Reagan’s Order, all “major” rules—that is, all regulations likely to 
have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more—must 
be accompanied by a CBA.35 CBA is a decisionmaking procedure that 
has its origins in welfare economics. Economic theory identifies the 
socially desirable level of environmental quality as the level that 
maximizes the satisfaction of individual preferences. CBA sheds light 
on policies that potentially improve aggregate welfare by converting 
gains (the value of the benefits to the beneficiaries) and losses (the 
costs to those who are burdened) into a monetary scale.36 In fact, 
Reagan’s Order required agencies to choose the regulatory objective 
that, according to the analysis, “maximize[d] the net benefits to 
society.”37 The Reagan administration hoped that CBA would support 
President Reagan’s deregulatory agenda by preventing the issuance of 
regulations, most of which were thought to be net costly.38  
Not surprisingly, given the administration’s motivations, Reagan’s 
CBA requirement was met with considerable criticism and skepticism 
from scholars and proregulatory groups.39 In particular, because many 
health and environmental regulations affect nonmarket goods, there 
was real concern that these hard-to-value benefits would be 
underestimated—or not estimated at all.40 In the view of these skeptics, 
CBA—or, at least, incomplete and poorly conducted CBA—would 
 
 34. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981). 
 35. Id. § 1(b). The currently applicable order, Executive Order 12,866, applies CBA to 
“[s]ignificant regulatory action[s],” defined as those that “have an annual effect on the economy 
of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy,” among other things. 
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
 36. CBA identifies the Kaldor-Hicks efficient policy as the one that maximizes the difference 
between the value of the gains to the winners and the losses to the losers without requiring the 
winners to compensate the losers. 
 37. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
 38. See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 
(2008).  
 39. See Granetz, supra note 17; Hoffman, supra note 17. 
 40. See, e.g., Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5 REG. 33, 35–36, 
38–40 (1981). 
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prevent agencies from issuing regulations that would actually be 
beneficial. The early CBAs, which left large categories of benefits 
unquantified, appeared to confirm some of these fears.41 But it is 
unclear how much agencies actually relied on these CBAs and whether 
it would have been sensible for them to do so. And, in at least a few 
cases, early well-supported CBAs actually convinced regulators to 
issue more stringent regulations.42 Moreover, CBA made the 
regulatory process more transparent. 
Perhaps that is why President Bill Clinton did not abandon the 
CBA requirement. He did, however, replace Reagan’s Order with his 
own—Executive Order 12,866.43 Like Executive Order 12,291, 
Clinton’s Order encouraged agencies to “select those approaches that 
maximize net benefits . . . to the extent permitted by law.”44 Clinton’s 
Order also placed more emphasis on accountability, providing several 
additional ways that transparency would be preserved during the 
White House review process.45 Further, it explicitly recognized “that 
some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify.”46  
President Clinton’s version of White House review of CBA 
requirements has had staying power. Presidents George W. Bush and 
Obama retained Clinton’s Order, though issuing their own 
supplements,47 and so far, President Trump has reaffirmed the Order’s 
goals of ensuring that regulations are net beneficial.48 Over the course 
 
 41. See generally Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. 
Government Do Benefit-Cost Analysis?, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 192 (2007) (examining 
“how benefit-cost analysis is actually performed by U.S. government agencies” by assessing CBAs 
of EPA regulations from the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations).  
 42. One example is the Reagan administration’s imposition of a stricter standard for phasing 
out lead in gasoline based on the results of CBA. See Statement of Christopher DeMuth, in 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1980S 508 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1994) (“A very fine piece 
of analysis persuaded everyone that the health harms of leaded gasoline were far greater than we 
had thought, and we ended up adopting a much tighter program than the one we had inherited.”). 
For more information about that CBA and the resulting standard, see Albert L. Nichols, Lead in 
Gasoline, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 49–86 (Richard 
D. Morgenstern ed., 1997). 
 43. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
 44. Id. § 1. 
 45. Id. § 6(b). 
 46. Id. § 1(b)(6). 
 47. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011); Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 
Fed. Reg. 2,763 (Jan. 23, 2007), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6,113 (Feb. 4, 
2009). 
 48. See Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Mar. 1, 2017). That said, President 
Trump has directed agencies to fulfill additional requirements, such as repealing at least two 
existing regulations before issuing a new regulation and imposing a regulatory budget that caps 
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of a few decades, CBA has, in large part, shed its antiregulatory 
association. It has instead emerged as one of several tools for 
presidential oversight of agencies—in particular, one that promotes 
transparency and rational agency decisionmaking.  
Although there is no counterfactual against which to measure 
CBA’s effect, reliance on CBA does not seem to have deterred the 
issuance of net-beneficial regulation. For one, great strides have been 
made in valuation methodology, significantly improving the quality of 
benefit estimates overall and especially in the environmental context.49 
In recent years, CBA has been effectively used to justify many 
stringent environmental regulations, including those aimed at 
mitigating climate change; this development has led some skeptics to 
at least tentatively accept the technique.50 Under the Obama 
administration, agencies such as EPA, the Department of Energy 
(“DOE”), and the Department of the Interior (“DOI”) conducted 
CBAs in which quantified and monetized benefits outweighed the 
costs. In particular, over the eight years of the Obama administration, 
these agencies issued significant rules in which monetized benefits 
greatly exceeded monetized costs.51 
These developments all took place largely without Congress’s 
explicit endorsement, but there is some evidence that Congress, too, 
has embraced the role of CBA in agency decisionmaking, at least in 
recent years. For example, a 2017 bill considered by Congress would 
have, among other things, codified requirements for CBA in most 
agency rulemakings.52 At least on the CBA issue, there appears to have 
been bipartisan support.53 In addition, during confirmation hearings for 
 
total incremental regulatory costs. These additional requirements are unlikely to improve welfare 
and might hinder some of the goals of CBA. See generally Caroline Cecot & Michael A. 
Livermore, The One In, Two Out Executive Order Is a Zero, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2017) 
(evaluating the effectiveness of the one-in, two-out policy in helping agencies be fiscally efficient). 
 49. See Richard L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1423, 1436–
50 (2014) (noting improvements in the ability of CBA to quantify previously unquantifiable 
benefits). 
 50. See generally REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 38 (describing how several 
environmental groups have embraced CBA).  
 51. For details, see reports to Congress issued by the Obama administration. OIRA Reports 
to Congress, OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-
regulatory-affairs/reports/#ORC [https://perma.cc/9XSS-S5BA]. Still, a large percentage of 
Obama-era rules had missing cost or benefit estimates.  
 52. See Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, S. 951, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 53. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, A Regulatory Reform Bill That Everyone Should Like, 
BLOOMBERG (June 22, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-06-
22/a-regulatory-reform-bill-that-everyone-should-like [https://perma.cc/K3AD-APK3]. Other 
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the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(“OIRA”), senators no longer questioned the legitimacy of White 
House–mandated CBA review. In fact, during the June 2017 
confirmation hearing of Administrator Neomi Rao, the hardest-hitting 
questions from Senator Heidi Heitkamp, Democrat from North 
Dakota, were about demanding rigorous CBAs from federal agencies, 
even for deregulatory actions.54  
B. Nuts and Bolts 
What explains the staying power of CBA in guiding agency 
decisionmaking? No doubt, all presidents appreciate the review 
process for oversight purposes. But part of CBA’s appeal for regulators 
is that it provides a clear methodology for achieving various statutory 
directives in light of difficult tradeoffs, especially when the underlying 
statutes require agencies to consider these tradeoffs in some way. In 
particular, when a statute gives an agency authority to manage a certain 
risk, the key decision for regulators is often the degree of risk reduction 
to require through regulation. This decision invariably requires trading 
off the costs of additional risk reduction with the benefits of such 
reduction. Congress sometimes determines how this tradeoff should be 
made; in some statutes, Congress requires maximum risk reduction,55 
all feasible risk reduction,56 or cost-benefit-justified risk reduction.57 
Often, however, legislation leaves these risk-management details to the 
agency, relying on the agency to decide what regulatory stringency is 
“requisite,” “appropriate,” or “necessary” to fulfilling Congress’s 
 
features of the Act have been more controversial. For more information, see the essays published 
on this topic in the Regulatory Review’s series, Assessing the Regulatory Accountability Act. 
Assessing the Regulatory Accountability Act, REG. REV. (May 30, 2017), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2017/05/30/assessing-regulatory-accountability-act [https:// 
perma.cc/B5UA-R9HK]. 
 54. Heitkamp Questions to Rao, C-SPAN (June 7, 2017), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?c4672872/heitkamp-questions-neomi-rao [https://perma.cc/XGG2-KTQ8]. 
 55. E.g., “Delaney Clause,” Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, 
§ 409(c)(3)(A), 72 Stat. 1784, 1786 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2012) and scattered 
sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 56. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2012) (requiring the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration to “set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible . . . that 
no employee will suffer material” health impairment). 
 57. E.g., Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(C)(i) (2012) (allowing the 
Administrator to set a contaminant level that maximizes health-risk-reduction benefits at a cost 
that is justified by the benefits). 
CECOT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/19/2019  3:26 PM 
2019] DEREGULATORY COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 1607 
objective of, say, “protect[ing] health and welfare.”58 Such language 
has been held to allow—and, in some statutes, require—the use of 
CBA to inform regulatory stringency.59 CBA has many desirable 
features, including forcing the agency to make relevant tradeoffs 
transparent, pointing to a particular level of regulatory stringency, and 
providing a succinct summary of the basis for the agency’s decision.60 
In fact, courts increasingly view conducting some form of CBA as 
engaging in the basic rational decisionmaking that is required by the 
APA.61 For these reasons, agencies routinely conduct CBA and rely on 
its insights when their statutory mandates permit them to do so.62  
CBA requires agencies to explicitly list, quantify, and monetize 
the effects—positive and negative—of a proposed regulation as 
compared to the status quo and other alternatives. The estimated costs 
are largely regulatory compliance costs, which approximate the social 
or opportunity costs of regulation. Social benefits, meanwhile, may 
include health improvements from cleaner air or water. An agency 
would proceed with a rule that requires a certain level of stringency 
when the additional benefits of the rule justify the additional costs of 
moving away from the status quo.  
 
 58. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2012) (governing the establishment of national ambient-
air-quality standards under the Clean Air Act). 
 59. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (holding that “the phrase 
‘appropriate and necessary’ requires at least some attention to cost”). 
 60. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing an 
early EPA CBA of standards issued under the Clean Water Act, which made transparent the 
agency’s weighing of benefits in the form of lower biochemical oxygen demand levels in water 
against compliance costs estimated to close eight mills and leading to 1,800 people laid off). Of 
course, it is possible that while the agency’s stated motivation is based on the CBA, its true 
motivation is not. If so, it might be argued that CBA makes the agency’s true reasoning less 
transparent. But if the agency asserts reliance on the CBA, then the soundness of the CBA is 
what is ultimately relevant. This is because a reviewing court may uphold an agency’s action only 
on the grounds upon which the agency purportedly relied when it acted. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 
318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943); see generally Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 
116 YALE L.J. 952 (2007) (discussing how the Chenery principle promotes transparency and 
accountability).  
 61. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1, 1 (2017) (noting that where CBA is authorized but not required, agencies typically 
must now provide nonarbitrary reasons for failing to consider CBA). But see Amy Sinden, A 
“Cost-Benefit State”? Reports of Its Birth Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10933, 10934 (2016) (noting a gap between the kind of CBA the Supreme 
Court has endorsed and the mode of CBA identified and advocated by Cass R. Sunstein). 
 62. Executive Order 12,866’s CBA requirements technically extend only to executive 
agencies. However, independent agencies must still adhere to their statutory mandates and the 
APA when conducting rulemaking, and their rules must withstand judicial review. These forces 
will continue to push them to conduct and rely on CBA in decisionmaking. 
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For many regulations, these benefits are the monetized value of, 
say, having a cleaner environment or a safer workplace.63 To value such 
environmental, health, and safety benefits, economists estimate 
society’s willingness to pay to reduce these risks.64 These estimates are 
typically based on revealed-preference studies. For example, EPA has 
adopted a “value of a statistical life” (“VSL”) measure to place a 
monetary value on reductions in mortality risk.65 VSL is calculated 
using information about workers’ wage-risk tradeoffs in the labor 
market.66 Generally speaking, the benefits associated with the 
reduction of these risks make up the largest component of all 
regulatory benefits. A similar type of revealed-preference 
methodology has been used to value local environmental amenities by 
analyzing how property values change as the environmental attributes 
of otherwise comparable properties change.67 Where revealed-
preference studies cannot be carried out, economists have relied on 
stated-preference surveys that obtain individuals’ willingness to pay or 
accept specific risk changes based on their answers to hypothetical 
scenarios.68  
The costs, in turn, would ideally be measured as the losses implied 
by the increased prices that the regulation causes. Typically, however, 
agencies estimate direct compliance costs and some indirect costs as 
proxies for these losses. In this context, too, there is uncertainty. Direct 
compliance costs can be difficult to estimate. When a regulation 
embraces flexible compliance methods, it has been particularly difficult 
for agencies to measure compliance costs, and they often overestimate 
such costs.69 
 
 63. See Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, 
Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221, 221 (1996). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates with Risks by Occupation and 
Industry, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 29 (2004). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See generally Sherwin Rosen, Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product 
Differentiation in Pure Competition, 82 J. POL. ECON. 34 (1974) (discussing how prices change in 
relation to spatial and environmental variation).  
 68. See generally ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS 
TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (Resources for the Future, 
1989) (assessing survey methods for valuing risk scenarios). 
 69. See, e.g., Hart Hodges, Falling Prices: Cost of Complying with Environmental Regulations 
Almost Always Less Than Advertised, Econ. Pol’y Inst. Briefing Paper (1997) (finding that the 
cost of compliance is often lower than estimated). 
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A complete CBA quantifies and monetizes all important costs and 
benefits. Of course, qualitative assessment is a valid and important 
aspect of CBA, as it recognizes that monetization is not always 
possible, given the state of research.70 Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866 
explicitly recognizes the role of unquantified costs and benefits in high-
quality CBA.71 But for CBA to be most useful, agencies should 
quantify and monetize effects to the extent possible.72 For this reason, 
CBA has been most controversial when it is applied to effects that are 
difficult to quantify or monetize. 
Over time, the set of unquantified effects gets ever smaller as 
research into impacts improves. When EPA first set out to monetize 
the health and welfare benefits associated with reducing air pollutants, 
for example, its task was not easy. But the analyses have improved over 
the years due to developments in underlying studies, and the agency 
now routinely monetizes a wide variety of costs and benefits, even 
those that were once thought unquantifiable.73 
A high-quality CBA not only quantifies and monetizes effects but 
also does so based on the best available scientific evidence, making 
reasonable and transparent assumptions and policy-based decisions.74 
In contrast, a low-quality CBA might rely on problematic studies, 
consider few regulatory alternatives, or analyze a small subset of 
relevant impacts.75 As with the concept of completeness, the concept of 
“high quality” is constantly changing. By design, a CBA must rely on 
ex ante estimates of costs and benefits, and these estimates might not 
coincide with the actual costs and benefits of the rule once 
implemented. As new evidence on the actual effects of a policy 
 
 70. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 71. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 35, § 1 (“Costs and benefits shall be understood 
to include both quantifiable measures (to the fullest extent that these can be usefully estimated) 
and qualitative measures of costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless 
essential to consider.”).  
 72. Id.  
 73. See Richard L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1423, 1436 
(2014) (“The evolution of regulatory cost-benefit analysis over the past several decades shows 
that agencies have eventually come to quantify important categories of benefits that they once 
considered nonquantifiable.”). 
 74. See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 23, at 590–603 (finding that courts pay attention to these 
features when reviewing agency CBA). 
 75. Id.; see, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229–30 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(rejecting the agency’s CBA for not considering relevant regulatory alternatives and impacts). 
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emerges, CBAs that were previously considered high quality when 
originally conducted might need to be reevaluated.76  
The choice of the “best available” evidence and reasonable 
assumptions in the course of estimating costs and benefits can be 
fraught with controversy. Consider, for example, the value of reducing 
carbon emissions, which is referred to as the “social cost of carbon.”77 
Economists have developed integrated assessment models that link 
greenhouse gas emissions, temperature changes, and monetary 
damages, but there is still considerable uncertainty surrounding the 
accuracy of the models’ estimates.78 Notwithstanding their flaws, 
estimates from these models are likely the best available, and the use 
of other methodology would require significant explanation.79 In 
addition, valuing greenhouse gas reductions raises controversial 
normative questions that include the appropriate discount rate,80 the 
treatment of catastrophic risk,81 and the use of global damages.82 In 
these debates, there are reasonable arguments in support of different 
perspectives, and multiple moves are likely supportable. But even in 
 
 76. See generally Jonathan B. Wiener & Daniel L. Ribeiro, Environmental Regulation Going 
Retro: Learning Foresight from Hindsight, 32 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2016) (suggesting that 
forward-looking analyses can be improved by considering the shortcomings of past projections of 
the future). 
 77. The social cost of carbon reflects the cost to society of the higher global temperatures 
caused by each ton of carbon emitted into the atmosphere. See generally INTERAGENCY 
WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF CARBON, SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY 
IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866 (2010) (describing the interagency process 
of developing estimates of the social cost of carbon). 
 78. See, e.g., Robert S. Pindyck, Climate Change Policy: What Do the Models Tell Us?, 51 J. 
ECON. LIT. 860, 860–62 (2013) (describing disagreements in interpreting models that account for 
the social cost of carbon). 
 79. See Richard Revesz et al., Best Cost Estimate of Greenhouse Gases, 357 SCIENCE 655 
(2017) (“[G]overnment and private sector analysts should continue using IWG’s central estimate 
of $50 per ton of carbon dioxide with confidence that it is still the best estimate of the social cost 
of greenhouse gases.”). 
 80. E.g., Christian Gollier & Martin L. Weitzman, How Should the Distant Future Be 
Discounted When Discount Rates Are Uncertain?, 107 ECON. LETTERS 350, 351–52 (2010). 
 81. E.g., Martin L. Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics of Catastrophic 
Climate Change, 5 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 275, 275, 276 (2011) (discussing the difficulty of 
measuring the catastrophic risk of climate change due to “[d]eep structural uncertainty [of] 
unknown unknowns” and “essentially unlimited downside liability on possible planetary 
damages”). 
 82. E.g., Gayer & Viscusi, supra note 24; Peter Howard & Jason Schwartz, Think Global: 
International Reciprocity as Justification for a Global Social Cost of Carbon, 42 COL. J. ENVTL. L. 
203 (2017); Arden Rowell, Foreign Impacts and Climate Change, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371 
(2015). 
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this value-laden area, CBA still serves a salutary role of making any 
policy choices transparent. 
In light of these methodological and other challenges, some critics 
have argued that CBA can be manipulated to justify any goal or 
regulation.83 But this is simply not true. Although there is considerable 
leeway in estimating the costs and benefits of regulation, given 
limitations in scientific studies and different normative considerations, 
CBA inputs are not without bounds.84 For example, estimates should 
not be based on disreputable studies, especially when reputable studies 
are available. Nor should benefits or costs be left unquantified when 
there is useful data available. In the case of the social cost of carbon, 
for example, an agency might be able to lower the value of carbon-
emission reductions to reflect only the benefits of reducing carbon 
emissions in the United States, but it cannot estimate the value at 
zero.85 Studies of agency action support this view of CBA. After 
reviewing economic analyses across presidential administrations, Art 
Fraas and Richard Morgenstern conclude that the key elements of the 
analyses have been “generally insulated from politics,” with 
differences “largely in areas for which there is reasonable debate 
within the academic community.”86 If the analysis in CBAs is 
“rhetoric,” it is constrained rhetoric. Of course, that is not to say that 
CBA is completely deterministic and static. Facts on the ground 
change, new scientific studies are published, and not all decisions can 
be made purely based on the scientific evidence.  
 
 83. E.g., Karl Coplan, Pruitt’s Arbitrary Cost Accounting is Built into the Concept of Cost 
Benefit Analysis, GREEN L. (Oct. 10, 2017), https://greenlaw.blogs.pace.edu/2017/10/10/pruitts-
arbitrary-cost-accounting-is-built-into-the-concept-of-cost-benefit-analysis [https://perma.cc/ 
7UP3-8MNR] (“[T]he manipulability of cost benefit analysis is an inherent feature of an analysis 
that seeks to apply monetized accounting concepts to values for which there are no dollar values 
and no accounting rules. Which argues against ever relying on cost benefit analysis for regulatory 
rulemaking in the first place.”).  
 84. See Posner, supra note 18, at 1197–98 (arguing that “it is not usually easy to manipulate 
cost-benefit data,” though acknowledging that some variables are hard to measure). 
 85. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1200 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that NHTSA cannot value carbon-emission reductions at zero, given scientific evidence, without 
explaining its reasoning); Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (“The 
Administrator finds that six greenhouse gases taken in combination endanger both the public 
health and the public welfare of current and future generations.”). 
 86. Art Fraas & Richard Morgenstern, Identifying the Analytical Implications of Alternative 
Regulatory Philosophies, 5 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 137, 142 (2014). 
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C. Benefits of CBA 
Generally speaking, agencies conduct CBA to determine whether 
to regulate and how stringently to do so. CBA, by its nature, is difficult, 
time intensive, and expensive. Agencies make countless decisions 
when conducting CBA—from deciding which impacts to measure to 
choosing the underlying studies that inform the estimation of impacts. 
For complicated rulemakings, the CBA itself can cost millions of 
dollars.87  
But the procedure has many virtues. In the first instance, it helps 
agencies adopt more efficient policies by encouraging real 
consideration of policy impacts, thus promoting transparency in agency 
science and policy decisions.88 The procedure also incentivizes agencies 
to conduct ever better and more complete analysis of costs and 
benefits. In addition, it pressures agencies to engage in retrospective 
review as a means of gathering the science- or evidence-based 
information needed to identify and change prior policies that are no 
longer efficient. Thus, increased reliance on CBA not only promotes 
rational agency decisionmaking in the first instance but also improves 
regulatory policy over time.  
1. More Transparency and Accountability.  Critics of CBA often 
describe it as prone to a dangerous kind of manipulation, where policy 
preferences determine outcomes and these preferences are more—not 
less—obscured because they hide behind science-based arguments.89 
This criticism relies on two assumptions. First, it assumes that if 
agencies did not conduct CBA, policy preferences would either not 
play a role in the process or be easier to discern. Second, it relies on 
CBA being able to justify any predetermined and underlying policy 
outcome. Neither assumption is reasonable. 
 
 87. As an example, an environmental impact statement, a type of specialized cost-benefit 
analysis required under the National Environmental Policy Act, can take between one and six 
years to prepare. The analysis can range in cost from $250,000 to $2,000,000. See THE NEPA TASK 
FORCE, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: MODERNIZING NEPA 
IMPLEMENTATION 65–66 (2003).  
 88. These features of CBA are enforced by courts under the APA’s “arbitrary or capricious” 
standard of review of agency decisionmaking. See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 23. 
 89. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 
33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 443 (1981) (“[CBA] is arbitrary . . . . The focus on particular problems 
legitimates arbitrary assumptions and masks their political content.”); Amy Sinden, Cass 
Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191, 194 (2011) 
(book review) (“The danger of CBA . . . lies in its false promise of determinacy, its pretense of 
objectivity and scientific accuracy . . . [which] renders CBA . . . vulnerable to manipulation . . . .”). 
CECOT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/19/2019  3:26 PM 
2019] DEREGULATORY COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 1613 
Because agency decisionmaking almost always involves making 
difficult tradeoffs between costs and benefits, the actual alternative to 
conducting CBA is not science-only decisionmaking or transparency 
about policy preferences. Instead, the alternative to CBA is making 
these policy-laden decisions while largely uninformed about costs and 
benefits, usually by pointing vaguely to some statutory directive or by 
citing agency expertise. This alternative would not be more 
meaningfully transparent than CBA. This alternative would, however, 
be more likely to result in decisions that are profoundly misguided. For 
example, consider a context in which an agency is not allowed to rely 
on CBA: EPA setting air-quality standards for criteria pollutants under 
the Clean Air Act.90 EPA cannot openly consider costs, so it engages 
in surreptitious and uninformed cost guesswork when deciding what is 
sufficient to protect health.91 This guesswork results in a standard that 
is less protective than one that CBA would justify.92  
Perhaps, then, the concern is that CBA-based decisions do not 
actually reflect more informed decisionmaking but receive more 
respect than do decisions not based on CBA. In particular, if CBA 
could be perfectly manipulated to justify any predetermined policy 
outcome, then using CBA to guide decisionmaking is, substantively at 
least, no better than acting on policy preferences without any analysis. 
But the decisions might falsely seem more informed.  
CBA, however, is not prone to that level of manipulation.93 CBA 
methodology, assumptions, and inputs generally have not varied 
significantly across administrations.94 This Article, in fact, identifies 
several CBA norms and argues that courts will review CBAs for 
compliance with those norms, constraining some policy changes. 
Admittedly, though, concerns about manipulation are high when 
large categories of costs or benefits are not quantified. On one hand, 
just because an impact cannot be quantified at the current time does 
not mean that it is not a real, even important, impact. CBA-based 
decisionmaking must allow an agency to consider such impacts. On the 
other hand, large gaps in the estimation of costs or benefits could 
provide a misleading picture of the overall effects—and generate 
 
 90. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2012); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 486 
(2001). 
 91. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental 
Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1232–33 (2014). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See discussion supra Part I.B.  
 94. See Fraas & Morgenstern, supra note 86. 
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significant room to act based on policy preferences. In fact, scholars 
have found evidence consistent with the view that unquantified impacts 
could be used to influence outcomes. In a review of major regulations 
from 2010 to 2013, Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner find that 
agencies failed to monetize the costs and benefits of regulations when 
in most cases they could have monetized or partially monetized those 
costs and benefits.95 They also conclude that these failures were 
“almost certainly masking errors of overregulation and 
underregulation.”96  
But unquantified impacts occur when CBA is not strictly followed. 
The alternative to CBA would leave all impacts unquantified and, a 
fortiori, be more prone to manipulation. Nonetheless, even assuming 
that unquantified effects within the context of CBA are prone to a 
more concerning brand of manipulation, they still would not leave 
CBA outcomes unconstrained. Courts limit reliance on unquantified 
effects by proscribing such uses as an attempt at wielding a “trump 
card.”97 This limit on the use of unquantified effects cabins their 
influence even if those effects are justifiably thought to be substantial.98 
This means that agencies generally cannot justify predetermined 
outcomes by manipulating the “value” of unquantified effects to make 
up any shortfall in the estimated effects.99  
Increased CBA reliance, then, reduces opportunities for 
manipulation as compared to likely alternative approaches, and it 
promotes better policies by encouraging sound quantification 
whenever possible. It opens the black box of agency decisionmaking, 
increasing transparency and allowing for meaningful accountability 
and judicial review. Even assuming that decisionmaking is actually 
 
 95. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of 
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 92 (2016). 
 96. Id.  
 97. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1225 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 98. Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner provide a framework to help agencies quantify 
and monetize effects within CBA when data is incomplete. See Masur & Posner, supra note 95, 
at 92–94. Richard L. Revesz argues for agencies to use breakeven analysis. See Revesz, supra note 
49 at 1425. Robert W. Hahn argues that unquantified effects should carry zero weight so that 
additional quantification is incentivized. See Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis 
of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1021, 1037–38 (2004).  
 99. This limit is likely to result in underregulation because benefits are more likely to be 
unquantified. And quantifying and monetizing benefits often leads to them having higher value 
in the analysis than the implicit value when they were unquantified. For example, economic 
estimates of the value of statistical lives are often much higher than the implicit values used when 
lives remain unmonetized. See W. KIP VISCUSI, PRICING LIVES: GUIDEPOSTS FOR A SAFER 
SOCIETY 1–6 (2018). 
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driven by some political or policy preferences, an explicit reliance on 
CBA commits an agency to attempt to justify these preferences using 
science and economics.100 This is because SEC v. Chenery Corp. 
requires a reviewing court to uphold an agency’s action only on the 
grounds upon which the agency relied when it acted.101 Therefore, 
when an agency purports to rely on CBA, regardless of its true 
underlying motivation, the agency’s action will be judged based on the 
soundness of its CBA. And a sound CBA imposes constraints on the 
available regulatory policies, allowing only those that are arguably 
welfare enhancing. In other words, CBA procedure forces agency 
officials to articulate and defend science-based rationales for their 
proposed regulatory policy. Thus, the Chenery principle dovetails with 
CBA to promote relevant transparency and accountability, even where 
CBA cannot force agency officials to reveal their true motivations.102 
Instead of obscuring decisionmaking behind science, CBA provides 
the best chance for elevating agency decisionmaking above policy 
preferences and making it about science. 
2. Better Policies.  CBA is a flexible constraint available to 
agencies that, in some circumstances, promotes the staying power of 
agency regulation.103 That is, CBA procedures give agencies the 
opportunity to issue rules that are more likely to stick. Because of the 
benefits of increased staying power that come from tying a policy to a 
CBA, agencies are incentivized to maximize reliance on best-available 
estimates of costs and benefits and to minimize reliance on 
unquantified effects. And if data is currently incomplete or 
unavailable, agencies are incentivized to promote the necessary 
research.104 Although it is sometimes impossible to fully quantify and 
 
 100. In addition, as discussed in the next Part, there are real economic and judicial constraints 
to policy changes grounded in CBA. 
 101. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943). 
 102. See Stack, supra note 60, at 993–98 (discussing how the Chenery principle generally 
promotes transparency and accountability, though not in the context of CBA). 
 103. In this account, CBA could be considered a tool that helps agencies maximize the staying 
power of the regulations they issue. Typically, scholars characterize CBA as a constraint on 
agency action within a principal-agency context, wherein CBA helps the president control agency 
decisionmaking. See Kagan, supra note 18 at 2277; Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the 
Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1994). See generally Posner, supra note 
18; 
 104. These predictions rely on continued access to and support for underlying scientific 
research. Without ongoing research, regulations will be based on increasingly outdated studies. 
However, research is diffused and funded by multiple sources, so it would be difficult for any one 
group to eliminate it. 
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monetize some effects, incentivizing quantification and monetization 
to the extent possible is a good thing. Once these effects are monetized, 
they establish a floor on the value in the analysis. As a result, regulatory 
policy becomes more efficient. 
Finally, the argument is not that CBA itself will lead to the best 
policies. Rather, it is that reliance on CBA encourages better 
consideration of impacts, which in turn leads to better policies. There 
are things that CBA, by itself, simply cannot do. Important criticisms 
include its failure to account for distributional impacts and other 
fairness-based considerations. These considerations are outside the 
scope of CBA. An agency could and should still deviate from a CBA-
based policy for the sake of considerations of equity or dignity, but in 
light of the CBA, the agency would have to transparently state and 
defend its decision to do so.105 This, too, is desirable from the 
perspective of accountability. It actually ensures that fairness- and 
dignity-based decisions are not masked by the technical process of 
agency rulemaking. 
3. Real Retrospective Review.  Virtually everyone agrees that it is 
important to look back and evaluate how regulations are actually 
working and to modify, update, or repeal them if they are not. In fact, 
every president since Jimmy Carter has sought to identify and address 
existing regulations that are inefficient through a process of 
retrospective review of regulatory costs and benefits.106 More recently, 
President Obama’s Executive Order 13,563 called on each agency to 
“periodically review its existing significant regulations to determine 
whether any such regulations should be modified, streamlined, 
expanded, or repealed so as to make the agency’s regulatory program 
more effective or less burdensome in achieving the regulatory 
objectives.”107 Even President Trump has embraced this idea to the 
extent that his Executive Order 13,771 encourages agencies to look 
 
 105. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 61, at 18. For a discussion of how the executive branch can 
deal effectively with the distributional consequences of regulation, see Richard L. Revesz, 
Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489 (2018). 
 106.  Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in 
Federal Rulemaking, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1257, 1264–66 (2006). 
 107. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011); see also Exec. Order No. 
13,579, 3 C.F.R. 256 (2012) (urging independent agencies to establish plans for periodic review); 
Exec. Order No. 13,610, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,469 (May 14, 2012) (setting policies aimed at reducing 
“unjustified regulatory burdens”). 
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closely at their existing stock of regulations to identify regulations to 
repeal or adjust.108  
It is difficult, however, to actually get agencies to look back at 
existing regulations and evaluate their effectiveness. According to 
Susan E. Dudley, past retrospective-review initiatives failed largely 
because agencies have no incentives to look back at regulations that 
they have already issued.109 She is optimistic that a regulatory-budget 
concept, like the one in President Trump’s Executive Order 13,771, 
might create those missing internal incentives.110 Although the Order’s 
budget and offset requirements might indeed provide some pressure 
for agencies to get rid of existing regulations, they are not likely to 
provide the incentives needed to ensure that existing ineffective or net-
costly rules are identified and repealed.111 The Order does not require 
agencies to prioritize net-costly regulations for repeal, and there are 
reasons to suspect that agencies would not prioritize such 
regulations.112 
An ongoing and judicially encouraged commitment to CBA, 
however, could create the right incentives for real retrospective review 
of regulations. If CBA functions as a gatekeeper for promulgating 
significant regulatory changes, then an agency that wants to change a 
prior policy—because, say, it believes that policy is not effective—has 
to go out and find evidence for its belief. Its best bet is to investigate 
the on-the-ground costs and benefits of the policy. By examining the 
actual effects of regulatory policies, an agency could set the 
groundwork for policy change and obtain useful information that could 
make its predictions about effects more accurate going forward.113 And 
that is exactly what real retrospective review is about. 
Of course, CBA has been around, and gaining momentum, for 
years. If CBA itself is enough, then why has retrospective review failed 
to take off? Sporadic CBA, the results of which can be discarded or 
 
 108. Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Feb. 3, 2017); see Cass Sunstein, Sludge and 
Ordeals, 68 DUKE L.J 1843 (2019) (identifying categories of rules that are ripe for repeal). 
 109. Susan E. Dudley, Can Fiscal Budget Concepts Improve Regulation?, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 259, 267–68 (2016) (footnote omitted). 
 110. Id. at 268. 
 111. Cecot & Livermore, supra note 48, at 9–10.  
 112. Id. 
 113. The “greatest virtue” of retrospective review is its potential to generate information that 
could improve agency estimation and analysis going forward. Adam J. White, Retrospective 
Review, for Tomorrow’s Sake, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (2016), 
http://yalejreg.com/nc/retrospective-review-for-tomorrows-sake [https://perma.cc/TQ85-
BYNW]. See generally Wiener & Ribeiro, supra note 76. 
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ignored when expedient, is not enough. What is needed is a 
commitment to the practice across administrations and an 
understanding of CBA’s role in policy changes. The signposts for an 
emerging commitment have been appearing in judicial opinions in the 
last few years—most prominently in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Michigan v. EPA114 and in D.C. Circuit decisions promoting rigorous 
CBA of financial regulations.115 The next Part describes the particular 
role CBA plays in constraining policy changes.  
II. CBA-BASED CONSTRAINTS ON POLICY CHANGES 
CBA can constrain agency decisionmaking and, in particular, 
changes in agency policy over time. Whenever a new administration 
gains control of the White House, changes in regulatory priorities are 
expected and often desirable. But administrative law—propelled by 
the APA’s requirement that agency actions not be “arbitrary” or 
“capricious”—has created a system of rules to ensure that any changes 
in course are rational and predictable.116 These requirements ensure 
that regulatory programs are not created and destroyed solely because 
of changing political tides. One of these administrative law checks is 
CBA, which serves as a powerful summary of the agency’s factual 
findings on the costs and benefits of regulations. CBA ensures that 
changes to policy are based on some evenhanded analysis of costs and 
benefits.  
If done well, a regulation’s original CBA can wield great influence. 
First, judicial review of agency policy changes in the context of CBA 
constrains swings in rulemaking. Courts already review all CBAs to 
make sure they are transparent and sensible. Although courts are 
generally deferential when first encountering an agency CBA, courts 
have taken a closer look at agency changes that depart from existing 
CBAs, requiring reasoned explanations for those changes. In 
particular, courts require agencies to explain why a new CBA is 
different from the old one. This makes it more difficult in some cases 
for an agency to change policy to perfectly align with a new 
 
 114. Justice Scalia, writing for the Supreme Court’s majority in Michigan v. EPA, declared 
that “[n]o regulation is ‘appropriate’ if it does significantly more harm than good,” Michigan v. 
EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015), and Justice Kagan, writing for the dissent, agreed that harms 
of regulation must be considered, id. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the majority—
let there be no doubt about this—that EPA’s power plant regulation would be unreasonable if 
‘[t]he Agency gave cost no thought at all.’”). 
 115. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1149–51 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 116. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
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administration’s priorities or preferences. Second, accepted CBA 
procedure further constrains changes. The status quo for any proposed 
changes now involves the old rule, and this regulatory baseline alters 
the costs and benefits of moving to a new policy. Ultimately, CBA 
reliance prevents huge welfare-reducing swings while allowing 
reasonable and transparent policy- or science-based modifications. 
A. Judicial Review 
Judicial review of agency CBAs constrains swings in rulemaking. 
In particular, the APA requires agencies to act rationally by explaining 
their decisions, especially when changing course from prior policies or 
regulations.117 When the prior policy relied on a CBA, a change from 
that policy must confront the prior CBA—both its underlying facts and 
its conclusions. This means that although courts are generally 
deferential when first encountering an agency CBA, courts are likely 
to closely scrutinize a new CBA to ensure that those explanations are 
present.  
1. A Soft Look on CBA.  Courts have long reviewed the adequacy 
of an agency’s CBA under appropriate challenges based on the APA. 
When an agency permissibly relies on a CBA in its decisionmaking, 
courts have been asked to review (1) whether the scope of the CBA is 
appropriate in light of the agency’s statutory mandate, (2) whether the 
agency preserved transparency by providing sufficient information in 
its CBA for notice-and-comment rulemaking and judicial review, and 
(3) whether the assumptions or methodology underlying the CBA were 
sound.118 Generally speaking, courts have been deferential when 
evaluating CBAs.119  
A CBA’s scope refers to the categories of costs and benefits that 
are considered, quantified, and monetized in the CBA. As discussed, a 
CBA is most useful when it quantifies and monetizes all relevant direct 
and indirect costs and benefits of each regulatory alternative. That way, 
regulators can make decisions based on complete information, 
minimizing the likelihood of unintended consequences. But deciding 
which costs and benefits to consider and how thoroughly to quantify 
 
 117. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 
(2009); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 118. See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 23. 
 119. Id. at 590. 
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and monetize each category often depends on the availability of 
information and agency resources. 
From the perspective of CBA, readily available impacts should be 
included.120 The argument for omitting impacts is typically an argument 
about statutory authority. Congress defines the agency’s task, and 
Congress can limit the agency’s consideration of some impacts when 
implementing the task. Courts generally defer to agency judgments on 
questions of scope unless the agency ignores a factor that Congress 
required it to consider121 or the agency does not treat costs and benefits 
similarly.122 At least one court has sanctioned an agency’s broad 
analysis of impacts when the statutory text did not restrict the agency’s 
consideration of impacts.123 In fact, any time the overall statute is 
committed to improving social welfare, courts should hesitate to 
interpret it as restricting an agency’s ability to account for important 
welfare changes. Courts have already encouraged this type of broad 
analysis in the context of costs, recognizing the unreasonableness of 
ignoring the indirect costs of regulatory intervention on net welfare.124 
It remains to be seen, however, if courts will extend this reasoning to 
indirect benefits and essentially require the agency to broadly consider 
all reasonable direct and indirect impacts when the statute is silent on 
the scope of analysis.125 
In addition, courts have promoted transparency in CBA.126 As 
discussed in the previous Part, one of the advantages of CBA in agency 
 
 120. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 121. See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 23, at 593–95. 
 122. See Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 979 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 123. See U.S. Sugar Corp. v. EPA, 830 F.3d 579, 625–26 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining that when 
the statutory “text does not foreclose the Agency from considering co-benefits and doing so is 
consistent with the [statute’s] purpose,” the agency may consider co-benefits). I would go further 
and suggest that the agency should consider co-benefits unless that is clearly foreclosed by the 
statute’s text or purpose. 
 124. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (explaining that the advantages 
and disadvantages of regulation include not just direct compliance costs, but also indirect “harms 
that regulation might do to human health or the environment”); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 
947 F.2d 1201, 1225 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that EPA must consider the indirect safety effects of 
substitutes for car brakes when banning asbestos-based brakes under the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (“TSCA”)).  
 125. It is difficult to argue that agencies should treat indirect benefits differently than indirect 
costs. See Richard L. Revesz, Pruitt Would Like Us to Ignore the Indirect Benefits of 
Environmental Regulations, SLATE (June 13, 2018, 12:38 PM), https://slate.com/ 
technology/2018/06/scott-pruitt-is-trying-to-undermine-environmental-regulation-in-a-
creative-way.html [https://perma.cc/65AJ-3H4J]. 
 126. See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 23, at 602–03. 
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decisionmaking is its transparency. CBA limits the agency’s ability to 
obscure the reasons for its judgments by requiring the agency to list, 
quantify, and monetize its considerations. A well-conducted CBA will 
reveal and explain all its components: assumptions, methodologies, 
and underlying models and studies. In that way, stakeholders can 
comment on these aspects of the CBA during the notice-and-comment 
rulemaking process, pointing out any errors or deficiencies or 
challenging the agency’s explanations, while providing the agency with 
an opportunity to correct its analysis. CBA transparency thus serves an 
important role in the deliberative rulemaking process. Courts have 
enforced transparency and disclosure obligations, even on seemingly 
obscure details such as the specific methodology behind an agency’s 
crash-risk analysis or the origin of statistics underlying a few 
estimates.127  
Courts generally do not weigh in on the substance of an agency’s 
methodology, nor do they frequently second-guess agency 
assumptions, choice of model, or other technical issues.128 In part, this 
reluctance is due to a recognition that many of these decisions cannot 
be made solely on the basis of science but rather, to some extent, reflect 
underlying values and judgments. These are also the kinds of 
challenges that are most often considered beyond the expertise of the 
judicial branch. But even in these methodological challenges, courts 
have sometimes undertaken a more thorough review when the relevant 
statute appears to require one,129 demonstrating that they are capable 
of doing so. 
2. A Hard Look on Policy Changes.  Historically, there are many 
examples of agencies changing course, and courts have closely 
evaluated those agencies’ policy changes. More than thirty years ago, 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) 
changed a prior policy, rescinding a passive-restraint requirement for 
motor vehicles that it had previously promulgated.130 The resulting 
litigation defined the contours of review under the “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard.131 In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the 
 
 127. Id.; see also Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. FMCSA, 494 F.3d 188, 199–202 
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). 
 128. See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 23, at 598–601. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34 (1983). 
 131. Id. at 42–44. 
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United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the 
Supreme Court scrutinized whether the agency 
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered 
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence 
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to 
a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.132  
The majority held that NHTSA had failed to adequately explain why 
it had rescinded the passive-restraint requirement.133 Specifically, the 
Court held that “an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is 
obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that 
which may be required when an agency does not act in the first 
instance.”134 Further, the Court reasoned that “[i]f Congress 
established a presumption from which judicial review should start, that 
presumption . . . is not against safety regulation, but against changes in 
current policy that are not justified by the rulemaking record.”135 
Although it speculated that “it may be easier for an agency to justify a 
deregulatory action,” the Court emphasized that “the direction in 
which an agency chooses to move does not alter the standard of judicial 
review established by law.”136 
The Supreme Court again confronted judicial review in the 
context of changing policy fifteen years later in Federal 
Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.137 The 
majority in Fox clarified that an agency is not subject to greater review 
when it changes a policy than it was or would have been when it created 
the initial policy in the first instance.138 But the agency must display 
awareness that it is changing its position and provide “good reasons” 
for the new policy.139 In particular, “a reasoned explanation is needed 
for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were 
engendered by the prior policy” because “[i]t would be arbitrary or 
 
 132. Id. at 43. 
 133. Id. at 34. 
 134. Id. at 42 (emphasis omitted).  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id.  
 137. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). The Court previously hinted 
at these issues in other cases, such as INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996). 
 138. Fox, 556 U.S. at 514. 
 139. See id. at 515.  
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capricious to ignore such matters.”140 In other words, it is not that the 
judicial review of policy changes is more stringent; rather, the agency 
may have to develop a more comprehensive record because it must 
confront and explain the facts developed in the first record. According 
to the Court, the matters that require attention and explanation include 
the facts and evidence that the agency previously found controlling.141 
It also suggested that the agency would have to consider the serious 
reliance interests created by the initial policy.142  
Most recently, in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,143 the 
Supreme Court again cited Fox for the idea that “a reasoned 
explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that 
underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.”144 In fact, it stated 
that a regulation that does not explain an inconsistency is arbitrary and 
capricious, and an arbitrary and capricious regulation, in turn, 
“receives no Chevron deference.”145 This language is striking; it 
suggests that defects in agency decisionmaking reflected in CBA could 
doom an agency’s regulation—even when the agency enjoys significant 
discretion. As in previous cases, the Court in Encino Motorcars was 
concerned about the “reliance interests” at stake, and the agency was 
thus required to give more than a “conclusory” explanation of the 
policy change.146 
Taken together, these cases roughly outline how judicial review 
reinforces CBA-based regulatory stability. When an agency relies on 
CBA in developing its policy, it relies on a summary of facts about the 
likely impact of the policy. When an agency wants to change course 
pursuant to a new CBA, it relies on a new summary of facts. That new 
CBA would have to explain the key differences and confront the fact 
that significant investments might have been incurred in reliance on 
the prior policy. This transforms the judicial review from a soft look 
that assesses technical inputs to a hard look that ensures that the 
agency provides reasoned explanations for any deviations. Judicial 
review of agency rationales has bite; inadequate explanation is one of 
 
 140. Id. (emphasis added). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016).  
 144. Id. at 2120 (quoting Fox, 556 U.S. at 515–516). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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the most common grounds for judicial reversal and remand.147 Kevin 
M. Stack explains how in State Farm, the agency’s initial reasons acted 
as a commitment device as well as “a basis for evaluating its own future 
actions implicating those grounds.”148 In the same way, by relying on 
CBA initially, an agency commits itself to a technical welfare-based 
rationale and ties its future self to at least explaining any deviations 
from that sort of reasoning.149 If the new policy improves on the old one 
in terms of welfare, as summarized in a well-reasoned and updated 
CBA, then judicial review has nothing to say. But if the new policy is 
not an improvement on those original terms, courts will require the 
agency to explain why. 
Admittedly, courts are not experts in what makes for a well-
reasoned CBA. In this regard, too, a court’s task is simplified when an 
agency changes a CBA-based policy in light of a new CBA. The record 
before the court includes the prior CBA and the new CBA. The prior 
CBA essentially announces to courts: here are the facts and evidence 
that the agency previously found persuasive and controlling. It thereby 
focuses judicial review, highlighting which seemingly technical inputs 
in underlying risk assessments might be ultimately important in driving 
the agency’s policy. Further, by monetizing the benefits to the prior 
policy’s beneficiaries, the prior CBA identifies and underscores the 
reliance interests at stake.  
B. CBA-Updating Rules 
An agency must follow certain “rules” to update regulations in a 
reasonable, CBA-justified way. These rules are based on economic and 
accounting principles that support the practice of CBA, and they are 
described in guidelines on CBA from the Office of Management and 
 
 147. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical 
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1035 tbl.6 (1990) (showing that about 
20 percent of remands in 1985 were based on an inadequate agency rationale); Richard J. Pierce, 
Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 61, 72 (1997) (suggesting that inadequate agency reasoning is the most frequent ground 
for judicial rejection of agency decisions). 
 148. Stack, supra note 60, at 997–98 (concluding that the reason-giving practice promoted by 
the Chenery doctrine “promotes conditions for rationality, regularity, stability, and principled 
accountability within the boundaries of acceptable discretion”). 
 149. See Buzbee, supra note 26, at 1401 (describing more generally how courts have 
“require[d] substantial engagement” with “contingencies” created by underlying facts and 
circumstances). 
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Budget or from agencies themselves.150 Most important for CBA-
updating purposes, the agency must include all relevant impacts, 
calculate costs and benefits relative to the appropriate baseline, and 
estimate impacts based on the best evidence available.151 The 
application of these rules is particularly important in the context of 
deregulation, where decisions on the baseline, input estimates, and 
scope carry significant weight.  
Under a welfare economics framework, a CBA should contain all 
effects of the proposed policy on social welfare. This ensures that 
regulators base their risk-management decisions on an accurate picture 
of the actual effects of regulatory action. In practice, however, it is 
impossible to estimate all effects. How many effects should the agency 
analyze in its CBA? When deciding where to draw the line, the 
economics perspective suggests that an agency should consider an 
effect as long as the value of the information to the decision exceeds 
the costs of obtaining the information. Even then, it is difficult to figure 
out which costs and benefits are important and to assess the costs and 
benefits of additional information ex ante. Agencies must also allocate 
limited resources to multiple rulemakings, which might explain the 
deference courts have given agencies on issues of CBA scope.152  
When a prior CBA exists in the administrative record, there is a 
reference point on the achievable scope of CBA. Any changes to the 
scope of benefits or costs in an updated CBA would require some 
explanation. If the scope expands to include additional effects in light 
of new scientific evidence of causal connections and harm, then the 
new CBA, by all accounts, is improved and provides a clearer picture 
of the actual impacts on social welfare. But it is difficult to find any 
economically grounded reason for reducing the scope of CBA, 
especially when there is readily available information on relevant 
impacts. In the deregulatory context, any new CBA should include all 
categories of benefits that were previously considered important and 
on which information has already been obtained.  
In addition, once issued and implemented, a policy becomes part 
of the baseline, or the status quo. Any modification of that policy 
requires a CBA that calculates costs and benefits from the baseline of 
that existing policy. In that way, a deregulatory CBA is not the inverse 
 
 150. See, e.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, OMB Circular A-4, 
Regulatory Analysis (2003); EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses (2014). 
 151. See, e.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 150, at 26; EPA, supra note 150, at 11-2.  
 152. Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 23.  
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of the prior CBA, unless the prior policy was issued recently and never 
implemented. In the context of deregulatory actions that rescind rules 
that have already been implemented, the new CBA has to compare the 
benefits of cost savings—that is, of reducing stringency or eliminating a 
technology-based requirement—against the costs of foregone 
benefits—reductions in air quality or other prior health- and welfare-
related benefits of the prior, implemented policy.  
Even assuming that some regulations were not CBA justified 
when issued, the costs and benefits of continuing an existing, 
implemented regulation are different than those of implementing a 
new regulation. On the cost side, firms may have already made 
expensive capital investments in pollution-control technology, and any 
changes to the rule might impose additional costs on the firms. This 
dynamic was recently highlighted when a letter from the electric-power 
industry urged EPA to keep the mercury and air toxics standards 
(“MATS”) in place.153 The industry had been fighting the MATS rule 
since it was issued, but at this point, it has spent more than $18 billion 
to comply with it.154 Now, “[g]iven the scale of investment, the industry 
groups said that regulatory certainty is ‘critical.’”155 Given that onetime 
investments have already been made, the benefits of rescinding the 
MATS rule would be very small. It would be difficult for the Trump 
administration to justify repealing the rule, even if EPA reevaluates 
the foregone benefits to society as being much smaller than the 
forecasted benefits of the MATS rule when it was originally 
implemented.156 Alternatively, the use of the MATS pollution-control 
technology might have become the market standard—or, perhaps, 
required by states—and adjusting to alternative, even if cheaper, 
technology might require significant adjustment costs.157 In all these 
 
 153. See Utility Industry Urges EPA to Keep Mercury Emissions Rule in Place and Speed 
Reviews, ENERGIZE WEEKLY (July 18, 2018), https://www.euci.com/utility-industry-urges-epa-to-
keep-mercury-emissions-rule-in-place-and-speed-reviews/ [https://perma.cc/G9GY-DCEQ] 
[hereinafter Utility Industry Urges EPA]; see also Coral Davenport & Lisa Friedman, The EPA’s 
Review of Mercury Rules Could Remake Its Methods for Valuing Human Life and Health, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/climate/epa-mercury-life-cost-
benefit.html [https://perma.cc/6BTK-XDHF]. 
 154. Utility Industry Urges EPA, supra note 153. 
 155. Id.  
 156. See Davenport & Friedman, supra note 153 (discussing how the Trump administration 
might exclude consideration of important categories of benefits of the MATS rule).  
 157. In ongoing research, Kerry Krutilla has tried to estimate the magnitude of cost savings 
and benefit losses from repealing technology rules, behavioral rules, and certification rules from 
DOT and EPA. Kerry Krutilla, Presentation at Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis 10th Annual 
Conference & Meeting: A Taxonomy for Improved Regulatory Evaluations (Mar. 16, 2018) 
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cases, the benefits of reducing stringency—the cost savings from lifting 
the regulatory requirements—might approach zero. 
This feature of CBA could be understood as a form of path 
dependence—and it is why CBA has been characterized “as a tool for 
defending the status quo.”158 By taking into account adjustment costs, 
CBA incorporates these realistic considerations that weigh against 
changing course—whether the change is the proposed implementation 
of the policy in the first instance or, once implemented, the proposed 
repeal of that policy. In particular, this effect makes it difficult to justify 
deregulatory actions unless the prior policy required high ongoing 
compliance costs; otherwise, the benefits of repealing the policy would 
be low, while the costs—adjustment or other costs—could be high. In 
this way, some forms of regulatory action are stickier than others from 
a CBA perspective. And overall, the existence of sunk costs and 
adjustment costs suggest that it might be more difficult to move away 
from some old, long-accepted regulatory requirements. 
Finally, rational rulemaking through CBA requires 
comprehensive, valid, and reliable measures of costs and benefits of 
alternative policies. These input values are largely based on the 
available scientific and economic evidence. A new administration 
might understand and characterize such evidence differently, but it 
cannot ignore the scientific evidence previously relied on, nor can it use 
scientific evidence that does not yet exist, and this constrains the moves 
it could make from the old rule. This constraint cuts in the opposite 
direction as the previous constraint; it suggests that it would be difficult 
to justify a new policy shortly after the prior policy was implemented 
because the scientific evidence supporting the prior policy is unlikely 
to have changed.  
This feature of CBA provides some protection against regulatory 
whiplash. But it does not have much constraining power when the 
deviation is from an old prior policy, where the intervening years likely 
produced new facts and realities. In those cases, the prior CBA might 
look quite obsolete, even if it was pathbreaking for its time. For 
 
(presentation materials on file with the Duke Law Journal). He has identified four critical 
characteristics that drive the level of costs and benefits from deregulatory actions: capital 
intensity, degree of voluntary market adoption, the scope of the regulation, and the nature of the 
health and safety risk. His initial findings reveal that current deregulatory CBAs often fail to 
consider these important characteristics, in some cases overstating the cost savings from 
deregulation. 
 158. LESTER B. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION: DECISION FRAMEWORKS 
FOR POLICY 24–25 (Brookings Institution 1981). 
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example, CBA led the Reagan administration to adopt a much stricter 
standard for phasing out leaded gasoline than either it or the previous 
administration initially thought warranted.159 If EPA were to revisit 
that decision, a modern CBA would likely have justified an even faster 
phasedown; more recent studies suggest that the benefits of phasing 
out lead in gasoline were substantially higher than initially estimated.160 
In this way, regulatory policy evolves over time as scientific 
understanding of the underlying regulatory problem advances. 
III.  DEREGULATORY CBA UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 
As discussed in the previous parts, CBA increasingly informs 
agency decisionmaking. In this CBA world, policy changes are more 
difficult. Although CBA does accommodate changing facts and values, 
there are constraints on valid updates to a CBA. As the prior policy 
becomes the new status quo, the benefits of moving away from it often 
become smaller, especially in the case of deregulatory actions after 
investments have already been made. In addition, Supreme Court 
precedent suggests that when evaluating the agency reasoning that 
underlies policy changes, the agency must provide a reasonable 
explanation for deviating from the prior policy. When the prior policy 
was supported by CBA, the agency has to confront the prior CBA and 
explain any deviations from that CBA’s assumptions and 
methodology. Courts have also required that agencies treat costs and 
benefits equally, again demanding a reasoned explanation for any 
differential treatment. Taken together, these principles constrain 
agency policy changes. The degree of constraint depends on three 
factors: (1) the statutory mandate to conduct and consider CBA, 
(2) the quality and completeness of the prior CBA, and (3) the agency’s 
reliance on the prior CBA. 
A. Degree of Constraint 
Generally speaking, when a court confronts a prior CBA in the 
record, it requires the agency to explain any deviations from that CBA, 
 
 159. See Statement of Christopher DeMuth, supra note 40. 
 160. See, e.g., Joel Schwartz, Societal Benefits of Reducing Lead Exposure, 66 ENVTL. 
RESEARCH 105, 119 (1994) (estimating net benefits of $17.2 billion per year for each microgram 
of reduction in average blood-lead concentrations); Debra J. Brody et al., Blood Lead Levels in 
the US Population, 272 J. AMER. MED. ASSOC. 277, 281 (1994) (estimating a ten-microgram 
decline in average blood-lead levels in children due in large part to the lead phasedown). 
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unless the agency is prohibited from relying on CBA.161 Sometimes the 
record includes a prior CBA that the agency could have but did not rely 
on. This might happen when an agency conducts CBA pursuant to 
executive order but disavows any reliance on it in determining 
regulatory stringency—even when the CBA would support its action. 
An agency might purposefully do this in order not to commit itself to 
CBA-based policy explanations and development—that is, to preserve 
its power to act without reliance on CBA. For example, when EPA set 
out to regulate hazardous air-pollutant emissions from power plants, it 
was required to first determine whether such regulation would be 
“appropriate and necessary.”162 As part of its decisionmaking, EPA 
conducted a CBA showing that the net benefits of regulating 
hazardous air pollutants would be up to $80 billion, especially when 
taking into account the particulate matter that would also be reduced 
under the regulation.163 Nonetheless, the agency refused to rely on this 
CBA to support its determination either in the rulemaking or in the 
subsequent litigation.164 Instead, the agency’s preferred justification for 
the rule relied on a less formal and more qualitative analysis that did 
not explicitly refer to costs, presumably in an effort to retain authority 
to set more stringent standards later.165  
In these cases, the power of the prior CBA to constrain future 
policy deviations is low. But even then, the CBA might be relevant if it 
supports the prior policy and is persuasive; it could call into question 
the agency’s reasoning for changing course, notwithstanding the 
agency’s disavowal of the analysis.166 For example, in R.J. Reynolds 
 
 161. Sometimes an agency’s statutory mandate does not allow it to consider costs or, by 
extension, a CBA. For example, the Clean Air Act prohibits EPA from relying on costs when 
setting national air-quality standards for criteria pollutants. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2012); 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). In that case, the CBA—whether prior or 
new—is legally irrelevant to the agency’s decision, which must be based on the statutorily 
permissible factors. Of course, this situation may present other limits on deregulatory actions. In 
particular, such statutory mandates prohibit CBA by prohibiting the consideration of costs. 
Where that is the case, deregulation motivated by cost considerations such as cost savings for the 
industry may be impermissible as well. 
 162. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012). 
 163. See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL MERCURY AND AIR 
TOXICS STANDARDS AT ES-1 TO ES-2 (2011). 
 164. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015). 
 165. The Supreme Court, in considering the Clean Air Act, ultimately held that section 
112(n)(1)(A)’s “broad reference to appropriateness encompasses multiple relevant factors,” 
which “include but are not limited to cost.” Id. at 2709.  
 166. More broadly, the prior CBA could highlight important factual issues that the agency 
would need to address under State Farm when it changes course. 
CECOT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/19/2019  3:26 PM 
1630  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1593 
Tobacco Co. v. FDA,167 the D.C. Circuit held that the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) did not provide substantial evidence 
that graphic warnings on cigarette advertising would directly advance 
its interest in reducing smoking rates to a material degree.168 Although 
the case was about limits on commercial speech,169 it is relevant here 
because the court used the agency’s own CBA against it; the CBA 
essentially conceded that graphic warnings would not directly advance 
the asserted government interest to a material degree.170 This case 
suggests that a prior CBA, if persuasive enough, could still have some 
constraining influence on agency policy even when the agency 
promulgating the initial rule did not rely on it. Any move to change 
such a policy should therefore confront that prior CBA.  
But it is when these three features coincide—statutory authority 
to rely on CBA; actual agency reliance; and high-quality or, at least, 
complete CBA—that the prior CBA has maximum constraining 
power. In such cases, an agency must not only acknowledge the CBA 
justification of its prior policy but also explain why it is departing from 
that justification. If the agency throws out a CBA-justified policy for 
no articulated reason, the agency’s decision is vulnerable to attack as 
arbitrary and capricious under the APA and, likely, under the relevant 
statute.171 When the prior CBA is incomplete, the agency can more 
easily make out good CBA-based reasons for changing course. For 
one, it could simply complete the CBA without having to justify its 
science- or policy-based choices against those in the prior CBA. If the 
prior CBA, for example, relied on qualitative assessment of benefits 
because reliable studies were not available, then the agency should be 
able to quantify and monetize these estimates once such studies 
become available. Similarly, when the prior CBA is low quality—
making questionable assumptions or relying on outdated methodology 
or inputs—the agency does, and should, have an easier time explaining 
deviations from those decisions in its new CBA.  
 
 167. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part by 
Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 168. Id.  
 169. In 2014, the D.C. Circuit overruled the part of the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. decision 
that limited application of rational basis review to narrow circumstances. Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d 
at 22–23. This perceived limitation on the application of rational basis review led the panel to 
apply a more exacting standard—intermediate scrutiny. 
 170. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1219–21. 
 171. An agency might put forth a non-CBA-based reason for such a departure. For example, 
the agency may argue that it no longer believes that it has authority to regulate. Part V.D.1 
discusses this kind of slippage. 
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Thus, relying on a high-quality CBA to support its policy is one 
way an agency can protect against future unwarranted abandonment 
of the policy. If the agency reassesses the CBA, it will have to explain 
any differences it makes to the prior CBA. Under the economics 
framework and in light of the Supreme Court’s emphasis on reliance 
interests, the agency will have to acknowledge the different costs and 
benefits of moving from the old policy to the new one. The new CBA 
would have to support this change. Although courts review the 
agency’s initial decisions on scope and methodology deferentially, 
courts will likely require reasoned explanations for any changes to 
scope and methodology in order to determine whether such changes 
were arbitrary or capricious.  
As discussed in the previous Part, providing a good reason for 
changing course is not as easy as it sounds. Courts have been strict in 
requiring reasoned explanations—even in the context of science-based 
or otherwise technical considerations. Recently, the D.C. Circuit 
rejected EPA’s decision to loosen a prior rule’s stringency in regulating 
carbon monoxide (“CO”) under some circumstances; the deregulatory 
move, according to the court, was arbitrary and capricious.172 The court 
explained that “EPA was operating against the backdrop of its own 
prior reasoned judgment that ‘minimizing CO emissions will result in 
minimizing non-dioxin organic [hazardous air pollutants],’” and that 
the agency’s “conclusion appears to be counter to the only empirical 
evidence EPA had before it.”173  
Requiring a reasoned explanation might be especially 
constraining when an agency attempts to alter the scope of a CBA. 
When reviewing the adequacy of a CBA, courts have demanded equal 
treatment of costs and benefits. A prior CBA provides a reference 
point for the achievable scope of a CBA. Any changes to the scope of 
costs or benefits could raise issues of unequal treatment, promote 
unbalanced analysis, or raise the risk of unintended consequences. For 
example, one district court has pointed to a prior Environmental 
 
 172. Sierra Club v. EPA, 884 F.3d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 173. Id. at 1198. In another example, EPA promulgated a maximum-contaminant-level goal 
of zero chloroform in drinking water under the Safe Drinking Water Act, see Final Rule: National 
Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts, 63 Fed. Reg. 
69,390, 69,398/3 (Dec. 16, 1998), despite earlier concluding that chloroform exhibits a “nonlinear 
mode of carcinogenic action,” with exposures below some level posing no risk of cancer, National 
Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts Notice of Data 
Availability, 63 Fed. Reg. 15,674, 15,686/1 (Mar. 31, 1998). The D.C. Circuit agreed with industry 
petitioners that EPA could not backtrack from its previous conclusion without sufficient 
explanation. 
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Impact Statement (“EIS”)—an analysis focused on environmental 
impacts that is otherwise similar to CBA—to cast doubt on the Bureau 
of Land Management’s reasons for quantifying the benefits but not the 
costs of a coal-lease modification in a new EIS.174 Already, the Trump 
administration has suggested that it might seek to limit the 
consideration of indirect benefits in its regulatory and deregulatory 
CBAs.175 If such changes to the treatment of benefits are not tied 
closely to the statutory language, then they will be suspect, especially 
if the scope of indirect costs is not similarly constrained. 
B. Constraints in Action 
How will these CBA-based constraints apply to the Trump 
administration’s deregulatory agenda? In several stays of rules pending 
reconsideration, the Trump administration has ignored the costs and 
benefits of the original rules. For example, DOI justified its decision to 
stay the implementation of the Waste Prevention Rule by pointing to 
“substantial time and resources to comply with regulatory 
requirements” that would be wasted if industries were forced to 
comply with the rule before the agency decided whether it would 
change course.176 But the DOI made no similar effort to consider the 
foregone benefits to society from the agency’s decision to stay the rule. 
Depending on the length of the stay, the foregone benefits could be 
substantial, as the rule was originally estimated to generate $127 
million in annual net benefits to society.177  
Such one-sided consideration of costs to support repeals or 
modifications of regulations would likely be deemed arbitrary and 
capricious. Although questions of CBA scope or depth are sometimes 
difficult for courts to evaluate, an agency decision based on an analysis 
that ignores benefits completely is easily seen as irrational. As 
discussed previously, courts look to statutes to define the appropriate 
 
 174. High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Service, 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1184, 
1189 (D. Colo. 2014). 
 175. Increasing Consistency and Transparency in Considering Costs and Benefits in the 
Rulemaking Process, 83 Fed. Reg. 27524 (proposed June 13, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R ch. 
I). 
 176. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; 
Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates, 82 Fed. Reg. 27430 (June 15, 2017) (to be codified 
at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3170). 
 177. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 83008 (Nov. 18, 2016) (43 C.F.R. pts. 3100, 3160, 3170). 
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scope of CBA.178 Though the statute might limit or expand the 
categories of costs or benefits that could be considered, almost every 
energy and environmental statute has a goal of achieving some benefit 
and tasks the agency with achieving that benefit under specific 
circumstances. Taking agency action without addressing these 
statutory benefits at all would miss an important aspect of the problem. 
Even assuming that a statute is ambiguous as to the consideration of 
benefits, these actions would rely on quantitative analysis of impacts 
without treating costs the same way as benefits. In fact, they would 
ignore benefits completely, defying “[s]imple logic, fairness, and the 
premises of cost-benefit analysis.”179 Simply put, when an agency relied 
on a prior CBA to justify its rulemaking, it cannot change course 
without acknowledging the foregone benefits and considering them 
equally with the cost savings from repealing or modifying the rule. 
Of course, the Trump administration has only pursued this 
strategy in stays of Obama-era rules.180 It is unlikely that the 
administration would do so when actually proposing to repeal or 
modify a rule, and it has not done so to date. In proposed repeals, the 
Trump administration agencies have signaled that they might 
deemphasize certain categories of benefits by leaving them 
unquantified or unmonetized; expand the categories of monetized 
costs; and recalculate CBAs, modifying the estimates of costs or 
benefits to support their new policies. For example, when the Trump 
EPA proposed the repeal of the so-called Waters of the United States 
Rule, the accompanying CBA left unquantified several categories of 
benefits that the Obama EPA had previously calculated.181 In 
 
 178. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 179. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 979 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 180. An agency’s omission could already be problematic at this stage, as the stays themselves 
are challenged and the reasons underlying the stays are litigated. See, e.g., Clean Air Council v. 
Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (invalidating the stay, but not on CBA grounds); Becerra v. 
DOI, 276 F. Supp. 3d 953 (N.D. Cal. 2017). Even stays of regulations have costs (the foregone 
benefits of the regulation during the duration of the stay) and benefits (the delayed incidence of 
compliance and other costs). It makes sense for an agency to consider such costs and benefits 
before deciding to freeze the implementation of final regulations. But interestingly, my account 
of CBA-based constraints increases the importance of issuing stays in the early days of a new 
administration. If regulations are not stayed, then costly investments are more likely to have been 
incurred in reliance on the prior regulations. In such cases, it is more difficult to justify changing 
course. 
 181. Compare EPA, Economic Analysis for the Proposed Definition of “Waters of the United 
States” – Recodification of Pre-existing Rules 8–11 (2017) [hereinafter EPA, CBA for the 
WOTUS Repeal] (describing deviations from the prior analysis), with EPA, Economic Analysis 
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particular, although the Trump EPA admitted that the prior rule 
extended protection to more wetlands, it refused to provide an 
estimate of the value of the foregone benefits of removing this 
protection, determining that the prior CBA’s estimates relied on 
studies that were too old to provide meaningful guidance as to the 
value of protecting such wetlands.182 The original CBA supporting the 
Waters of the United States Rule had quantified and monetized these 
benefits, providing default benefit estimates that Trump’s EPA could 
have used in its new analyses. Alternatively, agencies might seek to 
remove previously considered categories of benefits or to include 
previously unconsidered categories of costs. Newly omitted benefits 
could include the indirect benefits of regulations, the consideration of 
which has been opposed by regulated entities. Newly expanded 
categories of costs might include the impacts of regulations on jobs.  
By removing these categories of previously calculated benefits or 
by adding categories of costs that were previously not considered, an 
agency would improve the optics of the new CBAs underlying its 
deregulatory actions. But even these decisions on details of CBA scope 
and on the reliability of studies underlying CBA estimates—decisions 
that are generally granted substantial deference by courts—may be 
vulnerable, depending on the agency’s rationale for them. The prior 
CBA provides a powerful default for the appropriate scope and 
assumptions, and any deviations from this default would have to be 
explained. In the proposed repeal of the Waters of the United States 
Rule, EPA did provide an explanation for its choices, one that courts 
are likely to scrutinize. In particular, it argued that the studies used to 
value wetland preservation were too old and could not be relied upon 
due to subsequent improvements in statistical and economic methods 
and possible changes in public attitudes toward nature protection.183 
Although courts are less likely to pass judgment on technical issues of 
scope, underlying methodology, and assumptions, there is evidence 
that EPA was inconsistent in its treatment of costs and benefits; studies 
used to support the cost estimates were as old or older than the studies 
originally used to support the benefits.184 The repeal is thus vulnerable 
 
of the EPA-Army Clean Water Rule 44–52 (2015) (discussing, for example, the value of 
protecting wetlands as a result of the original WOTUS rule).  
 182. EPA, CBA for the WOTUS Repeal, supra note 181, at 8–9. 
 183. Id. 
 184. For a detailed description of inconsistencies in EPA’s treatment of costs and benefits, 
see Jason Schwartz & Jeffrey Shrader, Muddying the Waters: How the Trump Administration is 
Obscuring the Value of Wetlands Protection from the Clean Water Rule, INST. FOR POL’Y 
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to challenge, given the potential inconsistency in its explanation for 
departing from the prior CBA. 
Similarly, agencies might remove previously considered categories 
of benefits such as the indirect benefits of regulation. For example, to 
support the repeal of the CPP, the new CBA included calculations that 
ignored all the indirect benefits—sometimes called “co-benefits”—of 
reducing carbon emissions from power plants. Courts have held that 
the consideration of indirect costs is often necessary to reasoned 
decisionmaking unless precluded by statute.185 This is no less true for 
indirect benefits,186 though courts have yet to explicitly adopt this 
reasoning. Thus, many of these arguments will center on whether 
underlying statutes preclude consideration of indirect benefits.187 It 
seems reasonable that unless the statute clearly and explicitly precludes 
the consideration of indirect benefits, such benefits (just as with 
indirect costs) must be considered; such a requirement seems especially 
fitting in cases where resource concerns are not implicated because the 
agency has already calculated these benefits.188  
When the original CBA fails to quantify or monetize some 
category of benefits or costs, the agency has more leeway to change its 
qualitative judgment of those impacts. In such cases, a new judgment 
that the unquantified benefits do not justify costs, for example, is much 
more difficult to challenge on judicial review. In its proposed rescission 
of the Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands Rule, DOI 
failed to quantify and monetize any benefits,189 focusing only on cost 
savings. There, the original rule also failed to quantify and monetize 
 
INTEGRITY REP. (2017). EPA has proposed a revised rule defining “Waters of the United States.” 
See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4,154 (Feb. 14, 2019). 
 185. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (explaining that the advantages and 
disadvantages of regulation include not just direct compliance costs, but indirect “harms that 
regulation might do to human health or the environment”); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 
F.2d 1201, 1225 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that EPA must consider the indirect safety effects of 
substitutes for car brakes when banning asbestos-based brakes under the TSCA).  
 186. See Revesz, supra note 124; see also Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, 
Rationalism in Regulation, 108 MICH. L. REV. 877, 888 (2010). 
 187. So far, the D.C. Circuit has concluded that the consideration of indirect benefits is 
permissible when not expressly precluded by statute. See U.S. Sugar Corp. v. EPA, 830 F.3d 579, 
625–26 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 188. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) 
(limiting an agency’s consideration of an otherwise important factor only when the agency “has 
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider”); see also discussion infra Part 
V.D.1. 
 189. See Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands; Rescission of a 2015 
Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 34,464 (July 25, 2017) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160). 
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benefits.190 Because the benefits had not been quantified, the initial 
judgment to proceed with the regulation was based on the agency’s 
judgment of the value of the rule’s requirements. Even if there has 
been no change in the underlying evidence, it is easier to explain an 
agency’s reversal when the original analysis was qualitative and 
essentially relied on value judgments.  
Finally, the Trump administration might also encourage agencies 
to conduct new CBAs that recalculate the costs and benefits of 
regulations, subject to different valuations, assumptions, or 
methodologies. For example, in March 2017, President Trump signed 
Executive Order 13,783, withdrawing the technical documents 
prepared by the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of 
Greenhouse Gases.191 This Order leaves agencies without specific 
guidance on incorporating the social cost of greenhouse gases. This 
move signaled that the administration might encourage use of a 
different value for the environmental benefits of reducing greenhouse 
gases. Agencies could use different discount rates, underlying models, 
assumptions, and time horizons to recalculate costs and benefits. These 
changes could be based on policy preferences, new studies, or new 
information about the actual costs and benefits of implemented rules. 
As long as agencies explain departures from the prior CBAs and treat 
costs and benefits equally, courts are likely to uphold such 
reassessments. That said, the explanations for departures must still be 
reasoned explanations. It remains to be seen how much bite this 
limitation will have in this context. Overall, the Trump administration 
might be more successful in these cases, where the change in regulatory 
policy confronts the prior CBA and provides an alternative but 
reasonable view on the value of costs and benefits. Such a result would 
recognize that agencies should be able to pursue different policy 
considerations that are supported by the underlying evidence or to 
change their assessments of costs and benefits over time as new 
evidence emerges. Ultimately, CBA-updating norms and judicial 
review provide basic constraints to ensure that reassessments still 
support rational agency decisionmaking.  
 
 190. See Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,128 
(Mar. 26, 2015) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160). 
 191. See Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, Exec. Order No. 13,783 
§ 5(b), 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017). 
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IV.  DEFENSE OF CBA-BASED REGULATORY STABILITY 
As discussed, several forces—the prevalence of CBA-based 
agency decisionmaking, the hurdles inherent to CBA updating, and the 
nature of judicial review of policy changes—combine to generate a role 
for CBA in stabilizing regulatory policy. Whenever a new 
administration gains control of the White House, changes in regulatory 
priorities are expected and often desirable. But administrative law has 
created a system of rules in order to ensure that any changes in course 
are rational. CBA—once thought of simply as a tool of presidential 
control—fits into the administrative law landscape as a commitment 
device, constraining the terms of future policy changes. Its substantive 
component confines presidential control through methodological 
norms and judicial review. Regulations that are grounded in analysis—
even if that analysis invariably combines science with policy 
considerations—will be more difficult to change, hindering the 
agency’s ability to change policy to perfectly align with new priorities 
or preferences. This Part responds to several challenges to the overall 
desirability of allowing CBA to play such a role in stabilizing regulatory 
policy.  
A. Proregulatory Bias 
Some critics of agency rulemaking argue that agencies have a bias 
toward issuing regulation or value the benefits of regulation more 
highly than society in general.192 If this is true, then this Article’s 
account of CBA-based constraints on changes could exacerbate this 
proregulatory bias when it limits deregulatory changes. In other words, 
if (1) agencies overregulate, then (2) CBA-based constraints that limit 
deregulation could further entrench overregulation.  
First, there is no clear evidence that agencies have a bias toward 
overregulation or, if they do, that current CBA-based constraints do 
not help to counteract it. Many of the perceived mechanisms for such 
a bias could instead work in the opposite direction.193 Further, it is clear 
 
 192. See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080 (1986) (lamenting that regulation “tends to be 
excessively cautious (forcing investments in risk reduction far in excess of the value that 
individuals place on avoiding the risks involved)”); Yair Listokin, Bounded Institutions, 124 YALE 
L.J. 336, 369–70 (2014) (explaining why CBA would not correct this type of bias).  
 193. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1282–1304 (2006) (critically evaluating various theories of agencies’ 
tendencies to overregulate); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, 
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that in some cases agencies might need significant prodding to act. And 
there is some evidence that CBA constrains potential overregulation. 
As one extreme example, consider the aftermath of Corrosion Proof 
Fittings v. EPA.194 In that case, the Fifth Circuit ripped apart the CBA 
underlying EPA’s decision to ban asbestos-based brakes under the 
Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”).195 The case sent the message 
that if EPA were to restrict a chemical again under TSCA, it would 
have to support that decision with a well-supported CBA. This 
requirement appeared to constrain EPA so much that it stopped using 
TSCA altogether to restrict chemicals. In 2016, in response to EPA’s 
inaction, Congress passed the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety 
for the 21st Century Act, amending several key provisions of the 
TSCA. Time will tell whether this effort will successfully prod EPA 
into action. This tale demonstrates, however, that CBA requirements 
could counteract some agency overregulation—at least by ensuring 
that the agency does not issue net costly regulations. 
Nonetheless, an agency might value the benefits of regulation 
more highly than society. In such a case, Yair Listokin argues that CBA 
will help the agency choose the right regulations but the agency will 
still regulate too much.196 Theoretically, OIRA could monitor the 
agency’s estimates to help correct for this kind of bias. And, to some 
extent, OIRA does this oversight work. But OIRA is limited in staff 
and time and, moreover, might be subject to the same kind of bias. 
Alternatively, courts could monitor agency CBA for this bias. But here, 
too, courts are unlikely to adequately correct for it. It is not evident 
that judges could identify society’s true valuation of benefits, and in 
any event, judicial review of CBA is rarely as exhaustive as the Fifth 
Circuit’s review in Corrosion Proof Fittings. In practice, barring clear 
errors, courts are likely to be deferential. To the extent that this kind 
of overvaluation bias exists, agency CBA would not adequately 
counteract it.197  
Any bias, however, could be mitigated by undervaluation bias by 
another administration. In other words, imagine that one 
administration regulates too much and another one regulates too little 
 
Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1352 (2013) (“[F]or each claim there is a 
‘counter-cannon’ that weighs in the opposite direction.”). 
 194. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 195. Id. at 1225. 
 196. Listokin, supra note 192, at 370. 
 197. Listokin argues that a regulatory budget, like the one that currently exists, could help 
counteract this type of bias. See id. 
CECOT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/19/2019  3:26 PM 
2019] DEREGULATORY COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 1639 
for society’s taste. But all administrations choose CBA-justified 
regulations from the range of possible regulatory actions. Further, 
CBA forces each to make all of the underlying valuations transparent 
so that society can elect administrations that employ its preferred 
valuations. CBA would still serve a valuable constraining, stabilizing, 
and informational function. 
Nonetheless, under my account, there would remain a 
proregulatory asymmetry. The asymmetry does not come from CBA 
norms—CBA is symmetrical whether evaluating regulatory or 
deregulatory actions—but instead comes from my description of 
judicial review. This Article argues that courts are more deferential to 
the first CBA than the next CBA, which can be compared against the 
first. This judicial review asymmetry arguably works against 
deregulation because a deregulatory action is almost always a change 
from a prior regulatory status quo.  
As an initial matter, this asymmetry does not necessarily mean 
that deregulatory actions are more constrained than regulatory actions; 
rather, it provides a sort of first-mover CBA advantage. A later, more 
stringent regulation supported by CBA would face the same 
heightened judicial review constraints. And if the deregulatory action 
is the first action supported by CBA, then courts would review that 
CBA deferentially, and later proregulatory moves might be more 
constrained.198 It is also possible that a “deregulatory” agency could 
proactively regulate in statutorily prescribed contexts in ways 
supported by CBAs that employ its value judgments on costs and 
benefits, where such judgments are appropriate and applicable. In 
other words, after the first CBA, all other moves—regulatory and 
deregulatory—are subject to symmetrical judicial review. This greatly 
narrows the circumstances in which this asymmetry systematically 
hurts deregulatory policy.  
It is also worth noting that judicial review of CBA might develop 
over time such that courts become equally competent in analyzing 
CBA with or without any prior CBA in the record. Even now, whether 
reviewing the first CBA on the issue or the latest iteration, judicial 
review is never fully deferential or fully critical.199 Yehonatan Givati 
and Matthew C. Stephenson present a model that describes how an 
intermediate level of judicial review generally drives agencies to adopt 
 
 198. The prior deregulatory CBA could become part of the record in several ways, most 
prominently if interested parties bring it up and it becomes part of the agency’s record. 
 199. See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 23. 
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moderate policies.200 If review were fully deferential or fully critical, 
each administration would impose its preferred policy. Any agency 
bias during proregulatory administrations would be fully reflected in 
policies, and the inevitable swings would create instability that would 
almost certainly reduce welfare. By imposing analytical constraints and 
triggering an intermediate level of judicial review, CBA could have its 
most dramatic consequences in constraining biased—proregulatory 
and deregulatory—agencies, as compared to any alternative 
decisionmaking framework. Such agencies would adopt their most 
preferred option among reasonable CBA-justified options. These 
policies would be moderated both by the fear of intermediate judicial 
review and by CBA norms. In return, policies supported by CBA 
would enjoy staying power. Overall, policies would tend to be more 
efficient for society than in a world without CBA.  
B. Suboptimal Ossification 
A related challenge is based on the ossification literature. One of 
the justifications for agency—as opposed to congressional—action is 
promoting flexibility. CBA-based constraints could limit an agency’s 
ability to react to new facts and values. I call this phenomenon 
regulatory stabilization, but others have referred to it as ossification.  
Undoubtedly, there are costs and benefits to reducing an agency’s 
ability to make unconstrained policy changes. This Article highlights 
the benefits of making these constraints via a commitment to CBA. 
CBA-based constraints introduce a narrow kind of ossification that 
balances responsiveness with stability in a predictable way. Regulated 
agencies can assess a regulation’s staying power—and the 
reasonableness of their reliance on that regulation—by assessing the 
quality and persuasiveness of the CBA.201 As facts on the ground 
change, CBA does not constrain agency responsiveness. And CBA 
does not interfere with agency responsiveness during emergency 
 
 200. See Yehonatan Givati & Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial Deference to Inconsistent 
Agency Statutory Interpretations, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 86 (2011). In their model, when judicial 
review is too stringent or too deferential, agencies adopt highly partisan positions that are quickly 
reversed when a new administration takes control. Within that model, CBA could act like a 
commitment device that triggers an intermediate standard of review. If agencies care about the 
staying power of their regulations, then they might choose the most preferred CBA-justified 
position to trigger an intermediate level of review. If agencies do not support their policies by 
CBA, then changes are easy to explain; in other words, judicial review becomes highly deferential. 
 201. Aaron L. Nielson has recently argued that ossification can promote regulatory 
compliance by giving regulated parties some confidence in the regulation’s staying power, making 
costly investments worthwhile. See Nielson, supra note 26. 
CECOT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/19/2019  3:26 PM 
2019] DEREGULATORY COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 1641 
situations that are governed by statutory or APA procedures. The 
APA, for example, allows agencies to cite “good cause” under limited 
circumstances to avoid rulemaking procedures.202 Of course, such 
interim rules issued without regular procedures are also issued without 
CBA. Thus, CBA does not constrain when quick action is needed. 
Similarly, as soon as the emergency ends or another administration 
takes over, it should be easier to change course because courts will not 
be comparing CBAs. This is a good thing. Hasty policies should not be 
sticky; only well-reasoned policies should be. 
C. Elections with Bounded Consequences 
At worst, this Article’s account of CBA might suggest that once 
Congress delegates administration of a statute to an agency, agencies 
are accountable to no one. Elections, meanwhile, should have 
consequences. President Trump was likely elected in part due to his 
deregulatory agenda.  
Admittedly, the desirability of this account ultimately depends on 
one’s beliefs about how the president, Congress, and the public interact 
to influence agency action, as well as on one’s theory of democratic 
accountability. First, CBA matters only when Congress authorizes 
CBA—or, at least, does not prohibit its use.203 CBA then allows for 
changes supported by reasoned decisionmaking and transparent policy 
differences, affording regulated parties and society valuable 
predictability and stability. Nothing in this account of CBA suggests 
that elections should not or would not have consequences. Elections 
would still have consequences, but they would be moderated by 
congressional and societal precommitments to CBA. Even Justice 
Rehnquist, concerned about democratic accountability in his partial 
dissent in State Farm, argued that “[a] change in administration 
brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly 
 
 202. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). Whether that system is optimal is not the focus of this Article. 
 203. And, I would argue that statutory silence regarding CBA is increasingly likely to be 
interpreted as allowing CBA. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (demonstrating 
broad support, in both the majority and dissenting opinions, for agency accounting of the welfare 
impacts of regulation); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 223–26 (2009) 
(interpreting congressional silence regarding the permissibility of considering costs to allow such 
consideration); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2017) (noting that where CBA is authorized but not required 
agencies typically must now provide nonarbitrary reasons for failing to consider CBA); John D. 
Graham & Paul R. Noe, A Paradigm Shift in the Cost-Benefit State, REG. REV. (Apr. 26, 2016) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Riverkeeper created a default assumption in favor 
of CBA). 
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reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and 
benefits of its programs and regulations[, a]s long as the agency remains 
within the bounds established by Congress.”204 CBA-based constraints 
are not inconsistent with Justice Rehnquist’s view of the proper role of 
presidential influence on agency action. They can be considered the 
economic and accounting rules for “reapprais[ing] . . . costs and 
benefits” that keep the agency within the bounds established by 
Congress under the relevant statute and the APA.205 CBA constrains 
the swings, but it is still possible to move the meter a lot.206 And to the 
extent that CBA limits the president’s power to implement his or her 
preferred policies, it might make the president more likely to work with 
Congress to change the relevant underlying laws. This effect would 
certainly promote more democratic decisionmaking.  
Second, although democratic elections should have consequences, 
it does not follow that regulatory policy should swing with the 
preferences of the declared winner. As long as the median voter is 
unlikely to shift dramatically between elections, this system of CBA 
constraints does not result in a rejection of democratic principles. 
Rather, CBA may even, on net, enhance democracy through the 
transparency and accountability inherent in high-quality CBA-based 
decisionmaking. Thus, this Article’s account of CBA is also desirable 
under some theories of democracy if resulting policies actually align 
more with the median voter’s preferences and improve voter access to 
the agency’s reasoning.  
D. Undesirable Alternatives 
Finally, if CBA truly does raise the cost of changing course via 
rulemaking, then does it encourage changing course through other less 
visible and less desirable means? This Section addresses two 
possibilities in the context of deregulation.207 First, agencies might 
 
 204. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
 205. There is always a possibility that Congress could specify a different—non CBA-based—
decisionmaking rule for agencies in specific circumstances.  
 206. Although not necessary to this argument, in my view, society should commit to 
constraining regulatory swings. 
 207. This Section starts from the premise that there exists a regulation that a later 
administration would like to modify. This Article, therefore, does not consider the possibility that 
agencies might shift to modifying policies by guidance, which is not subject to CBA requirements, 
because courts have generally held that agencies are not allowed to modify regulations via 
guidance. See, e.g., Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993).  
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justify deregulation based on legal arguments, such as narrower 
readings of statutory authority, that get Chevron deference. Second, 
agencies might instead achieve deregulation through nonenforcement 
of federal law. Both of these critiques are overstated—or can at least 
be mitigated. 
1. Chevron Slippage.  This Article opens by discussing the Trump 
administration’s efforts to repeal the CPP. Whatever one thinks of the 
Trump EPA’s CBA, the Trump administration is not relying on it to 
justify its repeal of the CPP. In fact, EPA argues that its policy change 
is actually based on a different interpretation of a statutory provision 
underlying the CPP: 
EPA proposes a change in the legal interpretation as applied to 
section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), on which the CPP was 
based, to an interpretation that the Agency proposes is consistent 
with the Act’s text, context, structure, purpose, and legislative history, 
as well as with Agency’s historical understanding and exercise of its 
statutory authority.208 
EPA’s new interpretation of the statutory constraints in the Clean 
Air Act renders some of the CPP’s requirements outside its authority.  
Under administrative law principles, if the relevant agency action 
is a legal interpretation of a statute administered by that agency, courts 
apply the Chevron doctrine to evaluate the agency’s action. Under the 
Chevron doctrine, if the statutory provision is ambiguous (Step One), 
then the court defers to any reasonable agency interpretation (Step 
Two).209 There are two ways that the Chevron doctrine can be 
implicated and applied in this context. The first possibility is that a 
narrower interpretation of statutory authority is a Chevron Step One 
 
 208. Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Virginia; Amendment 
to Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,036 (Oct. 16, 2017) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). 
 209. In Chevron, the Court explained: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is 
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that 
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines 
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not 
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence 
of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer 
is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
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question, available to the agency only if Congress had clearly intended 
such an interpretation.210 I do not focus on this possibility because, if 
true, the original rulemaking, CBA justified or not, would be 
unauthorized by law.211 The second possibility is that Congress did not 
address this issue concerning the breadth of the agency’s statutory 
authority. In this case, the agency can implement its own interpretation 
of its authority as long as that interpretation is permissible, which the 
court would analyze under Chevron’s Step Two. Presumably. it would 
not matter if the new interpretation leads to an admittedly welfare-
reducing change in policy—prior or new CBAs notwithstanding—as 
long as it is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory language.  
This potential for deference to welfare-reducing policy changes is 
problematic. Put simply, it would generate a large difference in the 
level of review—Chevron deference versus State Farm’s hard look—
depending on the agency’s description of what it is doing. That 
differential could result in an agency painting its policy change in terms 
of legal interpretations instead of in terms of its view of the policy’s 
effects on society. Such a shift would be undesirable, as it would 
sidestep deliberation on the key factual and policy disputes that drive 
the agency’s action. For one, it would reduce accountability because 
the underlying policy preferences, couched as issues of statutory 
interpretation, would be less explicit. Second, it would limit the effect 
of debate on the desirability of different policies during the notice-and-
comment process. When the agency action is based on an assessment 
of costs and benefits, the notice-and-comment feature ensures that 
issued regulations reflect deliberative and informed decisionmaking by 
eliciting information that could shed light on the relevant effects. 
Finally, an agency should have to defend its policy by defending the 
goals and the ability of the policy to achieve those goals.  
One way to reduce this distortive difference in level of review is to 
apply the State Farm analysis under Chevron’s Step Two. In other 
words, courts could refuse to give Chevron deference to an 
 
 210. This possibility is explored more fully by William W. Buzbee. See William W. Buzbee, 
Agency Statutory Abnegation in the Deregulatory Playbook, 68 DUKE L.J. 1509 (2019). 
 211. That said, I would caution the court against finding this level of “clarity” in many of these 
contexts. It is difficult to defend the view that in the vast majority of cases, Congress truly had 
anything more specific in mind than a desire for the agency to use its expertise to act in the public 
interest on some technical issue. That sort of general intention, to the extent it is constitutionally 
permissible, is best implemented through CBA. See also discussion supra note 203 (discussing 
how the Supreme Court has been more receptive to CBA-based reasoning in the face of statutory 
silence). 
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interpretation that would not pass muster under the State Farm 
analysis. This would force agencies to clearly articulate and defend 
policy preferences and—to the extent that these preferences rely on 
some faulty or misguided assumptions—allow their policy preferences 
to shift based on new information.  
The nature of the analysis at Chevron’s Step Two has been the 
subject of significant scholarly attention and dispute. Ronald M. Levin 
first powerfully proposed merging Chevron’s Step Two with State 
Farm.212 In his view, there is no distinct dividing line between agency 
interpretation and policymaking that warrants any different 
treatment.213 Over the years, some prominent scholars have agreed 
with Levin’s argument,214 while others have been hesitant to fully 
embrace the simplification.215 Recently, Catherine M. Sharkey has 
reinvigorated this proposal in light of recent Supreme Court 
decisions.216 Sharkey points to cases such as Judulang v. Holder217 and 
Encino Motorcars218 as signaling a “subtle yet momentous shift” toward 
implementing State Farm analysis at Chevron’s Step Two.219 In her 
restatement, an agency would not get “Chevron deference for its 
resolution of ambiguities unless it can articulate a policy basis for that 
resolution that can meet the standards of State Farm.”220  
If the Supreme Court embraces this limitation on Chevron 
deference, then it would close the potential loophole caused by 
different standards of review, and that, in turn, would increase 
 
 212. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1253, 1263 (1997).  
 213. Id.  
 214. See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4, at 604 (5th 
ed. 2010) (“[T]he question whether an agency engaged in reasoned decision-making within the 
meaning of State Farm often is identical to the question a court must answer under step two of 
the test announced in Chevron . . .—is an agency’s construction of an ambiguous provision in an 
agency-administered statute reasonable?”). 
 215. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 611, 624–25 (2009); Cary Coglianese, Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1339, 1343 (2017); Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 
VA. L. REV. 597, 602 (2009). 
 216. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORD. L. REV. 2359 
(2018). 
 217. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011). 
 218. Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2120 (2016) (holding that an arbitrary and 
capricious regulation “receives no Chevron deference”); see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 
(2015) (demonstrating broad support, in both the majority and dissenting opinions, for agency 
accounting of the welfare impacts of regulation). 
 219. Sharkey, supra note 216, at 2368. 
 220. Id. at 2388–89. 
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transparency of policy-based preferences. Applied to the CBA context, 
the new Chevron Step Two could be implemented as follows: a court 
would decide whether a legal interpretation about statutory authority 
is reasonable by looking at the agency’s CBA, which evaluates the 
welfare effects of the interpretation. An interpretation based on faulty 
or questionable analysis should be deemed an unreasonable one. And, 
more controversially, an interpretation that admittedly results in net 
costs to society should be more likely to be deemed an unreasonable 
one in light of the overall welfare-enhancing purposes of most 
statutes.221  
In practice, however, courts have generally deferred to agencies 
under a broad range of circumstances222—even if the new 
interpretation might be less efficient from an economic perspective—
and have rejected a State Farm analysis in some of these cases.223 Many 
scholars have noted the increasing disdain for the Chevron doctrine by 
members of the Supreme Court. Justice Gorsuch, for example, has 
complained that Chevron deference enables an agency to “reverse its 
current view 180 degrees anytime based merely on the shift of political 
winds and still prevail.”224 Applying State Farm analysis at Chevron’s 
Step Two is one way to limit the range of agency discretion by focusing 
on the welfare effects of the policy and on the reasonableness of the 
underlying factual findings, as summarized in an agency’s CBA. This 
focus on CBA would alleviate Justice Gorsuch’s concerns about 
Chevron deference, promoting regulatory stability around reasonable 
policies through the operation of the CBA-based constraints.225  
 
 221. Courts could even define “reasonable” interpretations as those that are net beneficial to 
society, as demonstrated by some informal CBA. Admittedly, this application of the Chevron–
State Farm fix might go further than other scholars have suggested. 
 222. Reversals at Step Two are rare. See, e.g., Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron 
in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2017).  
 223. For example, Catherine M. Sharkey points to Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout 
Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017). The district court had applied a State Farm 
analysis at Chevron Step Two, but on appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the district 
court erred in incorporating the stricter State Farm analysis into its Chevron Step Two analysis. 
Id. at 507–08. 
 224. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
 225. This solution, however, might not be appealing to those who oppose Chevron deference 
as part of a wider attack on the administrative state due to its perceived threats to individual 
liberty and democratic accountability. See generally Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1933 (2017).  
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2. Nonenforcement.  A related concern is that if agencies cannot 
easily modify regulatory stringency because of CBA-based constraints, 
they might seek to change the de facto regulatory stringency by altering 
their enforcement strategies. According to a rational-actor model, 
firms comply with environmental regulations in order to avoid civil and 
criminal penalties. In particular, a firm decides whether to comply with 
environmental regulations by comparing the expected cost of 
compliance with the expected cost of noncompliance—that is, the 
probability of detection multiplied by the amount of the penalty. If an 
agency wants to make regulations less stringent, it could reduce 
enforcement efforts, which might result in less regulatory compliance. 
And if an agency wants to make regulations more stringent, it could 
increase enforcement efforts, which might result in more regulatory 
compliance. Arguably, this is a less desirable approach to changing 
regulatory stringency because it is less visible.226  
This concern has received much publicity in the context of 
environmental regulation. Historically, EPA enforcement has been 
sensitive to perceived preferences of the president and Congress.227 
More so than in the rulemaking context, presidents and federal 
agencies have enjoyed significant discretion when it comes to 
enforcement policy. And for good reason—an agency like EPA simply 
does not have the resources to comprehensively investigate all entities 
under the purview of federal environmental law. This discretion means 
that the Trump administration could significantly curtail enforcement 
efforts without many legal obstacles. In fact, the administration has 
been open about its hands-off approach to federal environmental 
enforcement.228 
 
 226. Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, 
Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 128 (2002). 
 227. JOEL MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA 185–202. 
 228. See, e.g., EPA, FY 2018 EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF (May 2017), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-05/documents/fy-2018-budget-in-brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y6DZ-UGZP] (calling for significant reductions to EPA’s enforcement 
budget); SUSAN PARKER BODINE, INTERIM OECA GUIDANCE ON ENHANCING REGIONAL-
STATE PLANNING AND COMMUNICATION ON COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE WORK IN 
AUTHORIZED STATES (Jan. 2, 2018) (outlining a more hands-off approach to federal 
enforcement). A New York Times report analyzing data on EPA-led formal enforcement actions 
suggests that this hands-off approach has already been implemented. See Eric Lipton & Danielle 
Ivory, Under Trump, E.P.A. Has Slowed Actions Against Polluters, and Put Limits on 
Enforcement Officers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/12/10/us/politics/pollution-epa-regulations.html [https://perma.cc/JG56-U6DM]. 
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But environmental enforcement is not that simple. Many 
environmental statutes are organized under a principle of “cooperative 
federalism,” where the federal government issues national standards 
and then works together with states to implement and enforce those 
standards. Some statutes, such as the Clean Water Act, outline a 
process by which states could seek “authorization” and take control of 
implementation and enforcement of environmental regulations.229 
Other statutes, such as the Clean Air Act, require states to develop 
implementation plans that include enforcement programs.230 Forty-
seven states are authorized to enforce the Clean Water Act, and all 
states primarily enforce the Clean Air Act.231 While EPA oversees state 
enforcement, conducts its own inspections, and brings enforcement 
actions in order to encourage consistent regulatory compliance across 
states, its efforts are dwarfed by state efforts. Under the Clean Water 
Act, for example, EPA has conducted about 4 percent of all inspections 
each year for the last eight years.232 And under the Clean Air Act, states 
are responsible for about 99 percent of full compliance evaluations.233 
In other words, enforcement is primarily driven by states, not by EPA.  
What might a change in federal enforcement mean for overall 
enforcement? It is difficult to say. On the one hand, given that the 
federal government’s role in environmental enforcement has always 
been minimal,234 a new, more hands-off approach might seem to have 
no effect; states might continue to enforce environmental law as they 
please, as they have all along. On the other hand, state enforcement 
responds to incentives.235 Studies have demonstrated, for example, that 
states tend to skimp on enforcement against facilities when the benefits 
 
 229. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). 
 230. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012). 
 231. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Mexico are not authorized to enforce the 
Clean Water Act. Idaho received authorization to enforce the Clean Water Act in June 2018. 
 232. See EPA Enforcement and Compliance History Online, Analyze Trends: State Water 
Dashboard, https://echo.epa.gov/trends/comparative-maps-dashboards/state-water-dashboard 
[https://perma.cc/5AS5-JGJJ]. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative 
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 303–04 (1999); Victor B. Flatt, 
A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failure of Enforcement in the Clean Water Act), 25 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1998). 
 235. See, e.g., John Donahue, Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America’s 
Devolution Debate, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 73–81 (1997); Eric Helland, The Revealed Preferences of 
State EPAs: Stringency, Enforcement, and Substitution, 35 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 242, 258–
60 (1998); Hilary Sigman, Transboundary Spillovers and Decentralization of Environmental 
Policies, 50 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 82, 83–84 (2005).  
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of increased compliance accrue to other states.236 To the extent that it 
gives states freedom to allocate their enforcement resources at their 
discretion, a hands-off federal enforcement policy could exacerbate 
these and other tendencies.237 In other words, a policy of federal 
underenforcement might give states more freedom to enforce federal 
environmental law according to their preferences.238 To those that 
generally prefer state control in this area, this might be a good thing. 
Instead of a focus on consistency, it might allow states to better tailor 
regulations to local conditions and enhance the net benefits of federal 
regulation. To those generally skeptical of state control, this might not 
be a good thing. It could make capture by powerful local interests more 
likely or exacerbate exposures to environmental harms faced by 
disadvantaged groups.  
Presidential and agency enforcement discretion is unlikely to go 
away. To the extent that CBA-based constraints encourage more 
drastic uses of enforcement discretion, there are other relevant 
actors—such as the public, nongovernmental organizations, and 
insurers—that constrain the overall effectiveness of this strategy. That 
is, notwithstanding any overall effect of such a policy on enforcement, 
there might still not be much effect on compliance. These actors can 
influence compliance through citizen suits, which are authorized under 
many environmental statutes; other litigation based on state common 
law; public pressure, especially if significant regulatory noncompliance 
is visible; and market-based drivers toward regulatory compliance, 
such as incentives to obtain lower insurance premiums.239  
CONCLUSION 
CBA was once considered a tool for implementing conservative 
regulatory policies, in part because benefits—which could justify 
 
 236. See Sigman, supra note 235.  
 237. See generally Caroline Cecot, Filling the Federal Enforcement Gap, 33 NAT. RESOURCES 
& ENV’T 36 (2019) (discussing how lower federal enforcement might affect state enforcement 
levels). 
 238. There might be some contexts in which states prefer to have a strong federal enforcement 
policy. As Cynthia Giles recently articulated, a credible federal enforcement threat might 
motivate companies to proactively work with states toward compliance because “if they don’t 
resolve their enforcement problems at the state level, they may have to face the EPA instead.” 
Cynthia Giles, Why We Can’t Just Leave Environmental Protection to the States, GRIST (Apr. 26, 
2017), https://grist.org/opinion/why-we-cant-just-leave-environmental-protection-to-the-states/ 
[https://perma.cc/BS7N-EQBS]. 
 239. See Cecot, supra note 237, at 38–39. 
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increasing the stringency of regulations—were difficult to monetize. As 
advancements have been made in monetization, CBA has shed some 
of its conservative associations and achieved more nonpartisan 
support. In fact, when the analysis is deployed thoughtfully, this Article 
argues that CBA—a limit on irrational government action—is as much 
a limit on deregulation as it is a limit on regulation. Indeed, CBA might 
be the unlikely champion for many progressives seeking to derail the 
Trump administration’s deregulatory agenda and to preserve at least 
some of the Obama administration’s regulatory legacy. If any rules are 
vulnerable to modification, repeal, or replacement, it is rules that were 
not supported by thorough CBAs.  
This Article argues that the increased acceptance of CBA should 
be applauded by all, regardless of political affiliation. In particular, 
recognition of the potential stabilizing influence of CBA on agency 
decisionmaking should incentivize more thorough analysis, more 
research into accurate assessments of costs and benefits, and 
appropriate retrospective review of existing regulations. Although 
broad delegations to agencies may reduce political accountability, 
society can also reap benefits from expertise and flexibility. CBA 
works well to ensure that we fully utilize agency expertise while still 
providing flexibility to respond to real changing conditions and values. 
And it does so while promoting accountability in this system by making 
presidential oversight and CBA-bounded control easier—especially 
when values play an important role in policymaking—and by forcing 
decisions to be transparent. Ultimately, by encouraging rational 
decisionmaking and reasonable updating, CBA and judicial review of 
CBA promotes predictability and plays a desirable role in stabilizing 
regulatory policy across presidential administrations. 
